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1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The adoption of the European Union’s (EU)1 Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP, known as the Maastricht Treaty)2 in 1992 marked a turning point in the 
Euro-Atlantic relationship. The Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, combined with broader 
political and security environment changes, brought pressure on the EU to assume more 
responsibility in peace operations. In the Petersberg declaration the Western European 
Union Council of Ministers decided to employ military units for humanitarian, rescue and 
peacekeeping tasks and also for tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking.3 The European Union incorporated the "Petersberg tasks" into the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty4 and initiated the establishment of a 60,000 strong Rapid Reaction 
Force (RRF) that is planned to be operational in 2003.5 Will the EU be able to conduct 
Petersberg-type operations? The thesis argues that the difficulties inherent in the 
formation of the CFSP, and the complexity of integrating policies into military 
objectives, will likely limit the effective use of the RRF in future military operations. 
European conflicts in the 20th century have twice led to world wars. Even today 
there are several local conflicts in Europe that are in danger of spreading unless the 
United Nations (UN) or regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and European Union, apply the necessary political and economic 
measures -- supported with credible military force, if needed -- to resolve them. Besides 
preserving international peace and security, the issues of protecting human rights and 
preventing humanitarian disasters has become one of the main objectives in international 
                                                 
1 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands established the European Union 
in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome. Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined in 1973, Greece in 
1981, Portugal and Spain in 1986, and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. 
2 Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht in 1992, EU Home Page: 
<http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc01.htm> (August 08 2002)  
3 Western European Union Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 1992, Berlin 
Information-center for Transatlantic Security Home Page: < 
http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs/petersberg92.pdf> (August 20 2002) 
4 The Amsterdam Treaty, signed on October 2 1997,  EU Home Page: 
<http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/amst/en/index.htm> (August 07 2002) 
5 The Helsinki European Council Decision, December 10-11, 1999, EU Home Page: 
<http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/Defense/esdpweb.htm> (July 15 2002) 
2 
military interventions. Over the last decade, multilateral military efforts have been 
applied frequently to preserve or restore peace in southeastern Europe. 
NATO has been taking steps to strengthen the security and defense role of its 
European allies for a number of years. Besides the EU’s CFSP, the introduction of 
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) in 19946 and the decision in 1996 to establish a 
European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)7 within NATO, both helped facilitate 
efficiency and burden-sharing. France and Britain, in the 1998 St. Malo Declaration,8 
expressed their determination to enhance internal EU defense cooperation further, while 
the Helsinki European Council (1999) agreed to develop common European security and 
defense policy (ESDP).9 Those key developments contributed to the creation of a basic 
framework for the EU to act in the future without the direct involvement of the United 
States (but relying on U.S. and NATO assets) in peace operations. At the Helsinki 
Summit in December 1999, EU leaders set out the goal of developing a Rapid Reaction 
Force by 2003, to enable the Union to play a more active role in collective security 
arrangements. The RRF will consist of 50,000-60,000 troops, with air and naval elements 
planned to be deployable within 60 days and sustainable for up to a year.  
To understand the EU’s future in peacekeeping, however, one should understand 
its past. In peace operations, such as in Bosnia and Kosovo at the end of the 20th century, 
armed peacekeeping units are indispensable; the military component of peace operations 
is an important part of crisis management. Yet these forces are only a tool of political 
will. As Karl von Clausewitz famously suggested in the 19th century, war is the 
continuation of politics by other means.10 The military therefore must understand the 
                                                 
6 Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council (``The Brussels Summit Declaration'') Brussels, 11 January 1994, NATO Home Page: 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940111a.htm> (July 16 2002) 
7 Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin 3 June 1996, Press Communiqué M-NAC-
1(96)63, Final Communiqué, NATO Home Page: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm> 
(August 12 2002) 
8 Franco-British summit, Joint declaration on European defense, Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998, 
Embassy of France Home Page: <http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/1998/stmalo.asp> (August 
12 2002) 
9 The Helsinki European Council Decision, December 10-11, 1999, EU Home Page: 
<http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/Defense/esdpweb.htm> (July 15 2002) 
10 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 87. 
3 
policy objectives for which it is fighting, in order to support their implementation. It is 
extremely important for both officers and politicians to grasp fully the complex 
relationship among policy, doctrine, strategy and operations in multilateral peacekeeping 
environment. 
Some of the differences between war and peace operations emphasize those 
issues. The (at least supposed) neutrality of peacekeepers, strictly applied rules of 
engagement, limited objectives, combined multinational operations and the active 
participation of civilian, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, make it 
far more difficult for soldiers to carry out their peace missions than more standard forms 
of combat. Poorly defined political goals make it hard in turn to formulate reasonable 
military objectives. Desirable basic conditions for sending troops into war -- i.e., vital 
interests of the contributing countries; wholehearted commitment with sufficient 
(overwhelming) force; clear political (and military) objectives; public and political 
support -- rarely have been met in peacekeeping operations.11 
In light of these difficulties, a deep understanding of politics, political decision-
making and the political environment in the theatre of operations is one of the keys to 
bridging the gaps separating policy, doctrine, strategy and operations. Political decisions 
have far-reaching implications for the military, from strategic planning to operations in 
the field, that are not always understood well by political and even military leaders. An 
educated analysis of the political environment and decision-making process could result 
in better contingency planning and more successful operations. While military leaders 
should avoid becoming politicized, to make the right decisions they have to develop a 
good understanding of the political environment, decision-making processes, principles 
of democracy, and their own limitations as well. 
The thesis assumes that the questionable legitimacy of armed humanitarian 
interventions, and the difficulties of formulating and translating common policy into 
sound military objectives, are the core stumbling blocks in civil-military relations in 
                                                 
11 So called ‘Weinberger Doctrine’, formulated by Caspar Weinberger, former U.S. Secretary of 
Defense, in a speech to the National Press Club in Washington, 28 November 1984, Caspar W. 
Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 
453, see also Alexander L. George, “The Role of Force in Diplomacy: A Continuing Dilemma for U.S. 
Foreign Policy” in Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems 
of our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 266-267. 
4 
European peace operations. To demonstrate this, the thesis analyzes two cases: the failure 
of the EU to resolve the Bosnian crisis from 1992-95; and the gaps between NATO 
policies and military objectives during “Implementation Force” (IFOR) operations in 
Bosnia and “Allied Force” in Kosovo. The thesis examines developments in CFSP 
institutions and in the EU-NATO relationship; the EU’s response to the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001; and their possible impact on future EU peace operations. 
The thesis seeks to answer four core questions pertaining to European peace 
operations in the 1990s: 
• What are the main constrains to common policy-making and the integration of 
political and military objectives? How can military force best support political 
objectives? 
• How well or poorly did the European Union’s policies support peace 
operations in the Balkan between 1992-95?  
• What were the major gaps between political and military objectives with 
respect to NATO’s IFOR and “Allied Force” peace operations? 
• How has the EU’s CFSP institution adapted to the challenges posed by the 
Balkan conflicts and the increasing international terrorist threat?  What are the 
possible implications of both the EU’s and NATO’s lessons learned for future 
EU military operations? 
To answer those questions the thesis is organized into four main chapters. 
Chapter II. examines the importance of legitimacy in peace operations, based on 
the collective character of decision-making and military intervention consistent with the 
principles of the UN Charter; favorable public opinion; and the support of non-
governmental organizations. It also discusses the growing importance of humanitarian 
considerations and the role of regional organizations in local conflict. The chapter 
reviews some of the major theoretical and practical difficulties in formulating collectively 
agreed policies, and implementing them with multinational military means constrained by 
national political will, resources, capabilities and international law. 
5 
Chapter III. analyzes the circumstances and effects of key EU policies related to 
peace-making efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992-95. The chapter reviews the 
development of CFSP tools, several problems with their implementation, the 
circumstances of failure, and the aftereffects of EU peacekeeping efforts on the EU’s 
internal structures and external relationships. 
Chapter IV. focuses on the consequences of gaps between political and military 
objectives in the cases of NATO-led IFOR and “Allied Force” operations in Bosnia and 
Kosovo. The chapter compares the main political and military objectives of those 
operations, based on an analysis of official documents and the pronouncements of key 
leaders. Although both operations were declared successful in military terms, there need 
to be improvements in the integration and interpretation of political and military 
objectives. The lessons of those operations may provide a good opportunity for EU 
leaders to understand the complexity and constraints of supporting political will with 
military force. 
Chapter V. reviews changes made to the CFSP in the late 1990s, and again after 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States. It introduces the roles and 
responsibilities of newly created organizations in the CFSP structure, and the relationship 
between NATO’s and the European Union’s decision-making bodies for planning crisis 
management activities. It presents an Action Plan declared by the EU, consisting of 
common policies, joint actions and practical arrangements intended to meet the new 
challenges of international terrorism. These new arrangements are supposed to contribute 
to the effective management of “Petersberg tasks,” and facilitate the fight against 
international terrorism; the obstacles to formulating common policies, however, may 
decrease the effectiveness of actions.  
The conclusion summarizes the theoretical and practical findings of the study. 
The thesis will show the importance of the relationship between policies and operations 
in peacekeeping, and the constraints the EU may face in the future in the planning and 
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7 
II.  POLICY-MAKING AND OPERATIONS PLANNING IN PEACE 
OPERATIONS 
This chapter argues that the core problem of contemporary civil-military relations 
in peace operations is not solely ‘who guards the guardians’ but a related issue, how to 
reach agreement on collective policies and how to implement them with multinational 
military means. In civil-military relations there are tensions between policies and 
operations that are a function not only of national political will, resources and military 
capabilities but also of international law, collective decision-making and multilateral task 
implementation. Both policy-makers and operations planners should consider the 
collective approach to be a foundation of legitimacy. Both civilians and the military 
should understand the advantages and hardships of collective implementation in order to 
utilize assets in the most effective way. 
Civil-military relations are not conducted on an isolated national game field 
reserved only for politicians and the officer corps. They are affected by many outside 
factors including domestic and international politics, institutions, laws, interests, culture, 
economics, public opinion and media. Civil-military relations become especially complex 
in military operations under multilateral and multi-layered political direction and 
multinational military command. Politicians and the military should be aware of those 
factors and, being polymaths, they must be able to think outside their own box and 
analyze the influence of other players and elements. 
This chapter highlights some of the specific problems of international peace 
operations, including debates on policy formulation and implementation. It is organized 
into two main sections. Section A examines the question of legitimacy of interventions, 
the basic issue that divides opinions in domestic circles and the international community. 
The section describes the evolution of peacekeeping into humanitarian interventions, and 
the three building blocks of legitimate peace enforcement. Those building blocks are the 
collective character of actions in consistence with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter12; favorable public opinion; and the support of non-governmental organizations. 
                                                 
12 United Nations Charter, UN Home Page: <www.un.org/aboutun/charter/> (9 October 2002) 
8 
Both politicians and military leaders should consider the legitimacy of operations to be 
the foundation for correct policies and achievable operational goals. Section B collects 
some of the general ideas and lessons learned about political and military considerations 
in peace operations as a subtype of limited conflicts. In doing so it also reviews some of 
the political, economic and technological changes (including democratization, 
globalization and the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs) of the 1990s that have had 
a considerable effect on peace operations. 
Because of the space limitations of this essay, it was impossible to explore every 
aspect and possible effect these variables might have on operations, but the work reflects 
the complexity of the field, as well as the author’s priorities and views on the main issues. 
There are two basic obstacles to drawing ready conclusions on the topic. First, the 
available literature in the fields of policies, military operations and other outside factors 
tends to concentrate on only one or the other of those areas, rather than considering them 
as a whole. Secondly, as each case is different, it is impossible to develop some magic 
formula on how to implement policies with military means in the most effective way 
every time. There are, however, some general concepts and findings that might be useful 
as a guide for both politicians and the military in formulating decisions and implementing 
operations. 
 
A. ROLE AND LEGALITY OF PEACEKEEPING 
As early as the 18th century, Immanuel Kant introduced the basic requirements of 
international law that would allow nations to avoid war, and the idea of a federation of 
nations to collectively safeguard and preserve world peace.13 Those early ideas came to 
life in the Covenant of the League of Nations, which entered into force on January 10, 
1920. During its twenty-six years of existence, sixty-three nations became members of 
the League. As such they agreed: 
… to promote international co-operation and to achieve international 
peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by 
the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations, by 
                                                 
13 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, The History Guide, Lectures on Modern European Intellectual 
History: <http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/kant.html> (5 January 2003) 
9 
the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the 
actual rule of conduct among Governments…14 
Although the League failed to prevent World War II, the idea of international 
cooperation to keep world peace was preserved and led to the birth of the Organization of 
United Nations (UN) in 1945. The UN Charter, its founding document, is more than just 
a treaty of peace. It was created to provide a legal framework and common understanding 
on which to base what was hoped would be a more peaceful future. As a means to this 
noble end, however, the Charter has some shortfalls. 
1. From Traditional Peacekeeping to Interventions 
One of the characteristics of the changing security environment in the 1990s was 
the decreasing number of interstate wars and the increasing number of internal conflicts. 
Although the fighting and potential mass terror inherent in many of those conflicts are 
confined within a domestic arena, the moral aspects reach outside state borders. 
Although the vast majority of these conflicts primarily involve groups 
fighting within states, the distinction between internal and external conflict 
is becoming blurred: the loss of life and impact on neighboring states 
requires that the international community consider intervention in both 
cases.15 
Whereas the international community is often concerned about the violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights, and sometimes is motivated to apply all 
the necessary measures of crises management, the principle of non-interference into a 
nation’s domestic jurisdiction limits the possibilities and raises questions about the 
legitimacy of military intervention. 
One legitimate means of mitigating conflict available to the members of the UN is 
peacekeeping, “a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of 
conflict and the making of peace.”16 From the organization’s inception, peacekeeping has 
been the main instrument members use to fulfill the UN Charter’s primary function of 
                                                 
14 George Gill, The League of Nations from 1929 to 1946 (New York: Avery Publishing Group, 1996), 
165. 
15 Andrew J. Goodpaster, When Diplomacy is not Enough: Managing Multinational Interventions (New 
York: Carnegie Corporation, 1996), 11. 
16 An Agenda for Peace, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992, paragraph 20, UN Home Page: 
<http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html> (5 September 2002) 
10 
maintaining world peace.17 Although the Charter does not contain the word 
“peacekeeping,” former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold referred to the 
concept as "Chapter Six and a Half". He placed peacekeeping between traditional 
methods of resolving disputes with peaceful means (Chapter VI, Article 33 (1)), and 
more forceful action, such as embargoes and military intervention (Chapter VII). The use 
of peacekeeping as a means of conflict abatement is quickly increasing. Thirteen 
peacekeeping operations were instigated between 1945 and 1987; 36 were created 
between 1988 and 1998, of which ten missions currently are running.18 
Traditional peacekeeping mainly serves to preserve a previously agreed-upon 
truce between opposing armed forces.19 The fundamental peacekeeping guidelines were 
laid down during the Suez crisis in 1956, and remain relevant today:20  
• the UN Security Council should authorize the operations; 
• the conflicting parties must agree on UN involvement;  
• the UN mission must be neutral toward both parties; 
• coercive force may be used by peacekeepers only for self-defense;  
• participation is on a voluntary basis and must exclude states with interests 
in the conflict.  
The basic requirements to run a successful UN peacekeeping operation remain 
unchanged as well. As described by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, these are as follows:21 
• a clear and practicable mandate (resolution) for action; 
• the determination and contributions of member states to implement the 
resolution;  
• continuing support from the Security Council;  
                                                 
17 United Nations Peacekeeping, Briefing Paper, UN Home Page:<www.una-
uk.org/UN&C/Peacekeeping.html> (23 July 2002) 
18 United Nations Peacekeeping, an Evolving Technique, UN Home Page: 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/intro/1.htm> (20 September 2002) 
19 Bo Huldt, “Working Multilaterally: The Old Peacekeepers’ Viewpoint,” in Beyond Traditional 
Peacekeeping, ed. Donald C. F. Daniel (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 103. 
20 Stanley Meisler, United Nations: The First Fifty Years, (New York, The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995) 
335. 
21 An Agenda for Peace, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992, paragraph 50, UN Home Page: 
<http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html> (5 September 2002) 
11 
• effective command and control arrangements;  
• adequate financial and logistical support to see the operation to a 
conclusion. 
The principles of traditional peacekeeping, however, are not applicable and the 
requirements for successful operations are barely achieved, in many of today's internal 
conflicts. Among the most typical complications: the agreement of conflicting parties 
rarely is guaranteed; the humanitarian dimension of events calls for urgent intervention; 
the Security Council or UN member states are hesitant or slow to take any decision; or 
peace can be reached only with decisive military means (i.e., Kosovo). The established 
practices of traditional peacekeeping have not been adapted flexibly enough to meet new 
challenges. The U.S.-led operation in Somalia and UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) 
mission to Bosnia are examples of post-Cold War failures at peacekeeping. In both cases, 
the warring factions had their own agenda and refused to accept the interference of UN 
peacekeepers. Although in each case the humanitarian catastrophe required quick 
decisions and decisive action, the UN lacked an effective decision-making procedure or 
united command and control arrangements, as well as sufficiently powerful military 
forces ready to go in. 
The end of the bipolar world division in 1991 and resultant democratic changes in 
many countries, directed the attention of the international community to the importance 
of fundamental human rights.22 In one speech, U.S. President Bill Clinton established 
parallels between the importance of national interests and human values.23 Some 
American experts went even further. Joseph Nye, for example, proposed that:  
in democracy, the national interest…can include values such as human 
rights and democracy…. A democratic definition of the national interest 
does not accept the distinction between a morality-based and interest-
based foreign policy.24 
As a result of this shift, U.S. security strategy, beginning in 1999, defines the 
defense of democratic principles as one of its main goals. 
                                                 
22 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948, 
UN Home Page: <www.un.org/Overview/rights.html> (5 June 2002) 
23 Martin Ortega, “Military intervention and the European Union,” Chaillot Paper 45, (Paris – March 
2001), 71. 
24 Ibid., 73. 
12 
The UN Charter recognizes the inherent need for protection of human rights as 
well, and reaffirms members’ faith in those rights (Articles 55-56). But at the same time, 
the Charter also highlights the importance of state sovereignty and self-determination 
(Article 2(7)). The principles of non-intervention and protection of human rights can be 
contradictory. The increasing trend towards internal conflicts has exacerbated this 
tension, particularly as international interventions more often are undertaken in support of 
a humanitarian mandate. While national self-interest has not disappeared as a factor in 
decisions to intervene, in many cases it plays a secondary role or does not come into play 
at all. For example, intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was initiated to prevent humanitarian 
crises and maintain international peace and stability. In that case is hard to detect any 
pure national interest on the part of intervening states. 
Except in those cases when member states or regional organizations (i.e., the 
Economic Community of West African States, and NATO) were willing to take action, 
the UN has lacked effective procedures - as in the case of Kosovo - to intervene under 
moral obligation in the internal affairs of states. As the provision on the fulfillment of 
human rights obligations does not seem to be guaranteed in any way, this author agrees 
with the statement that the “principle of non-intervention in a state’s internal affairs no 
longer appears adequate.”25  
International military intervention in support of the UN Charter and 
international law thus requires a willingness on the part of member states 
to acknowledge the precedence of malicious acts such as genocide and 
gross violations of human rights over the sovereign rights of statehood and 
to permit such action under Article 42 of the Charter as is required to 
prevent or stop violations.26 
Nevertheless, if the international community is going to intervene, it is extremely 
important to define the checks and balances on legitimate actions that serve to enforce 
human rights, free of political agendas, national or other interests. 
Ortega argues (3) that the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention can be 
established on moral or collective grounds. Moral justification is very hard to establish 
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across cultures, however, as values, beliefs, ideas and traditions differ widely country by 
country, or even group by group. While there is no such thing as an international society 
shared among all states, and international law regulates the relationships between rather 
than within states, the idea of collective justification seems to be more promising. The 
legitimacy of military intervention may be based on a majority consensus and gain the 
support of the international community and national populations. 
2. Collectivity and Regional Organizations  
One of the most powerful words in the UN Charter is “collectivity.”27 The 
principle of collectivity legitimizes the decisions of the United Nations as the highest 
authority within the international community. The UN Security Council (UNSC) is the 
body with primary responsibility, under Article 24(1), for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Although it has often been hard for UNSC members to 
reach a common understanding on many issues, the end of the Cold War division 
between the Soviet and Western blocs improved the chances that members will agree to 
authorize collective security actions based on principles and values (i.e., Bosnia), rather 
than self-interest. As an example of the changing political environment, in 1990 the 
Security Council authorized peace enforcement operations under Chapter VII, in 
response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, for the first time since the Korean crisis in 1950. 
Furthermore, peace operations since the early 1990s often have involved a broader 
variety of tasks, such as peace enforcement, electoral support and democratic 
development initiatives, than did traditional peacekeeping.  
Humanitarian and collective military interventions evolved into two main types, 
though their distinctions sometimes tended to blur. Martin Ortega defines (6) 
humanitarian intervention (e.g., Kosovo) as when “one state or a group of states use 
armed force to alleviate the suffering of human beings in the territory of other states.” 
The collective approach to intervention, with its emphasis on international peace 
and security and an evolving role for regional organizations, characterized the operations 
of the 1990s.  According to Neil McFarlane: 
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The practice of intervention in the post-Cold War period was dominated at 
the global level by actions mounted by coalitions of the willing under UN 
mandates (UNITAF in Somalia in late 1992, Operation Uphold 
Democracy in Haiti in 1994, NATO'’ insertion of IFOR into Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1995, the Italian-led Operation Alba in Albania in 1997 
and the Australian-led INTERFET in East Timor in 1999)…28 
The role of regional organizations and the legitimacy of their actions for 
the sake of international peace and human rights are based on the United 
Nations Charter, as well as on the principles of collective and 
humanitarian interventions. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter encourages 
regional actors to work together to resolve disputes within their region, but 
stops short of defining what such arrangements should be.29 
In some cases, the UN Security Council only legitimized military interventions 
(e.g., Northern Iraq and Kosovo) after the fact. The clear humanitarian goals of these 
operations nevertheless gained the broad acceptance of the international community even 
in the absence of an authorizing UN mandate. These cases and others demonstrate the 
need for a new principle or set of rules allowing more flexible collective military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes. 
The justification of international intervention is widely debated. Some propose the 
preconditions of the “Just War” doctrine for contemporary interventions: 
The operation must be conducted under a competent authority; for just 
cause; after peaceful means have been tried and failed; if there is a 
reasonable chance of success; and with a sense of proportion and 
discrimination, i.e., not merely for revenge which will, inter alia, harm 
innocent civilians, but to produce a better result.30 
Others argue that the concept of triggering interventions in support of 
international peace could broaden unmanageably to include all conflict with human rights 
violations, refugee migrations and internal armed struggles. In those cases, the legitimacy 
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of collective intervention should be consistent with established criteria, such as the 
severity of the rights violations and humanitarian concerns.31 
 Based on different views and suggested criteria,32 some of the basic rules for 
humanitarian intervention by regional organizations are proposed here as a guideline. 
a. Situation: 
1. Humanitarian catastrophe is very likely, (based on the reports of 
reliable international organizations [IOs] and non-governmental 
organizations [NGOs]). 
2. Peaceful means have not brought a positive result (Chapter VI). 
b. Requirements: 
1. A more exact definition of regional organizations, formulated and 
legitimated by the UN. 
2. The decision on military intervention should be collective, made by 
the UNSC or regional organization(s). 
3. The UNSC has the right to stop or take the lead in any phase of the 
process. 
4. The policy preparation and decision-making process should be open 
and clearly communicated to all members. 
5. The purpose of the action should gain the support of the international 
community. 
6. The policy goals and strategic objectives should not reflect national 
interests of any kind. 
7. Military action should be collective, multilateral and in line with the 
principles of the UN Charter (except that of non-interference in state 
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sovereignty, but only to the degree necessary to avoid humanitarian 
disaster) and humanitarian law, as well as laws of war. 
8. The military can use only minimum force. 
9. Rules of engagement should be in line with UN operational practices. 
Regional organizations should be involved in collective post-conflict 
management as well. One example of an international restoration effort is the 
Yugoslavian province of Kosovo, where international and regional organizations are 
working together under the leadership of a Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General. Among other organizations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
ensures overall security, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) directs efforts in democratization and institution building, while the European 
Union manages economic reconstruction.33   
The first building block of legitimate military intervention is a collective 
approach. Because of contradicting principles, quick and decisive UN action remains a 
desirable, but elusive, goal, which may be balanced in the future with the development of 
a clear set of rights and responsibilities by which regional organizations can apply crisis 
management tools on a collective basis. If regional organizations are willing to intervene 
and commit forces to peace operations under or without the UN umbrella, they must 
carefully adapt the examples and experiences of the past. They must adjust their doctrine 
and strategies to the requirements and characteristics of multilateral peace operations, and 
fine-tune their institutions, analytical and collective decision-making structures and 
procedures to respond effectively to new challenges. 
3. The Roles of Public Opinion, Media and International Organizations 
The second building block of legitimate peace operations is favorable 
international public opinion. The growing number of democratic regimes, the border-
erasing effects of globalization and the rapid development of communication and 
information technology all strengthen the importance of public opinion. The opinion of 
electorates is important in democracies: the public affects policy formulation and 
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reinforces or decreases the legitimacy of policy decisions. But public opinion is also a 
function of other factors. 
There is a very complex relationship among policy-makers, NGOs, the public and 
the media. Many argue that the so-called “CNN effect” -- the immediate public outcry 
produced by live footage of humanitarian disasters beamed into millions of homes around 
the world -- plays an important role in policy decisions as well as public opinion 
formulation; others deny the cause-effect relationship or see it as a two-way or more 
complex interaction. Like the problem of the chicken and egg, it is often hard to define 
which piece of this puzzle has the most determining effect on final decisions. It is most 
likely that each actor contributes more or less to the process with each individual case. 
The conventional wisdom says that media play a significant role in shaping public 
opinion and policies. On the one hand, audio-visual coverage of crises, particularly 
massacres and widespread suffering, often causes outrage around the world. On the other 
hand, there is some evidence that both citizens and officials are experiencing “sympathy 
burn-out” due to constant exposure to images of tragedy or brutality.34 For some, this 
may be in part because their own peaceful and secure environment prevents them from 
understanding and feeling empathy with the situation they see on television. For example, 
only an average 15% of Americans paid close attention to the brutal Balkan conflict in 
1993 and 1994.35 However, different activist and interest groups can multiply the effects 
of media coverage by rallying and lobbying for their specific agendas, as often happened 
in the 1990s.   
It remains debatable what, if any, direct effect media have on policymaking. 
According to Warren Strobel, “The media seemed to have an impact when policy was 
weakly held, was already in the process of being changed or was lacking public 
support.”36 As collective actions require collective decision-making, a long doubtful 
process of integrating different views and interests into coherent policies, the media can 
easily stamp their influence on the outcome. Although the nature of collective 
humanitarian operations is supposed to be less political than other forms of collective 
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action, the use of force and the risks at stake increase media and public interest. This high 
interest in turn contributes to the strengthening of openness policies as well as the 
legitimacy of final decisions. It also strengthens civilian control over military operations. 
The collective and humanitarian characteristics of military interventions and the 
use of force in the 1990s gained the support of the Western public in most cases. At the 
same time, public willingness to accept casualties among their peacekeepers generally 
remained low. Two conflicting trends resulted:  “civil society demanded more assertive 
action, including military operations, on the other hand there was a general reluctance to 
fight wars that might result in significant casualties.”37 
Those contradicting demands limit the options of policy-makers in the use of 
military force for peace operations. Policy-makers are pressed to come up with solutions 
to satisfy electorates and the international community, but they must accurately assess 
and consider the risks to intervening forces in any decisions they take. The military 
strategy has to mirror this expectation of a low casualty level, and that often means 
making a trade-off between safety and speed. For example, strong British interventionist 
sentiments during the Bosnian crises pressed the government to persuade the electorate 
“that the decision to employ armed forces should be determined not only by the justice of 
the cause but also by their likely efficacy.”38 
As Ortega defines them, (45) other important features of public opinion are a 
short-lived memory and the inclination to manipulate and make judgments about 
situations of which people have little in-depth knowledge. For these reasons, although 
public opinion certainly should be taken into consideration, it should not be the main 
argument for a particular policy decision. 
Non-governmental organizations are the third building block of legitimacy. The 
significance of NGOs both in policy-making and in the realization of peace operations 
grew in the 1990s. Although they follow very different agendas and have various 
organizational cultures, their local contacts, knowledge of the environment and expertise 
in the field can make them important contributors to crisis management. During the 
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period in question, NGOs frequently affected policies by raising awareness of 
humanitarian crises and demanding “public interest and government involvement 
alike.”39 NGOs also have had an impact on military operations. Their work contributes to 
the peace-making and peace-building efforts of governments, therefore their presence on 
the field must not be neglected in military consultations, or support and security 
arrangements.40 
B.  CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: POLICIES AND OPERATIONS 
Power and diplomacy always go together… Certainly power must always 
be guided by purpose, but the hard reality is that diplomacy not backed by 
strength is ineffectual…Power and diplomacy are not distinctive 
alternatives. They must go together, or we will accomplish very little in 
the world.41 
There is a historic debate about the primacy of civilian vs. military leadership in 
war. There is also a question whether politicians can or should interfere in the conduct of 
warfare. As Eliot A. Cohen, in his book Supreme Command points out, the views on 
those matters have changed over time, case by case, and leader by leader.42 
 In peace operations, as in war, policy and operations are strongly linked together. 
If one of them fails the other also will suffer. While the primacy of policy is hard to 
challenge, however, the translation of policy into military strategy and the conduct of 
operations may require specific knowledge and capabilities that are not always readily 
available to civilian policymakers. As Richard Betts points out:  
Practitioners usually think of strategy in terms of a linear model, but actual 
war usually resembles the circular…. model, where events in each phase 
generate feedback, altering the other functions. Results and unforeseen 
requirements of operations alter strategy, and changed requirements of 
strategy reshape political objectives.43 
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It is essential for policymakers and practitioners to take into consideration all the 
circumstances and continuous changes of situation that demand undisrupted vertical 
communication and flexibility, as well as team effort. In such a situation, the sharing of 
experience, knowledge and opinion among civilian and military leaders is mission 
critical.  
1. The Changing International and Domestic Environment 
The post-Cold War peacekeeping environment is multilateral, involving military 
forces from a number of countries, working together with civilian organizations. As a 
result, there have been considerable changes in civil-military relations affecting both the 
theory and practice of that concept. Policy-making, strategy, doctrine formation, mission 
requirements and operational planning; the structure and relationship among 
multinational forces; and the interface between military organizations, IGOs and NGOs, 
have become multi-layered and collective in nature. 
The international and domestic environment also underwent other radical changes 
during this time. Two of the most important changes are the accelerated democratization 
processes and strengthening of democratic civilian control over national militaries. 
Globalization put its mark on every corner of society; the rapid evolution of 
communications and information technology made information (which is ‘power’) 
available practically to everyone. The so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) 
changed the character of warfare through the introduction of new technologies, which 
sooner or later will change strategies, tactics and the military itself. 
a. Democratization, Democratic Control 
By the year 1998, the world had seen what is known as the “third wave” of 
democratization, when the percentage of electoral democracies rose from 27% percent in 
1974 to 117 in 1998, more than 60% of all countries.44 Along with political, societal and 
economic changes, democratization in most cases reinforced civilian control over 
militaries through new or established legal, constitutional and institutional frameworks. 
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While it is generally accepted that military conflict among democratic states is less likely, 
among states making the transition to democracy, the likelihood of strife remains high.45 
Policymakers among democratized countries can expect similar responses 
from the other side to given behaviors, due to a shared political culture; because of the 
mutual gains of cooperation, the formation of alliances among democracies becomes 
more probable.46 This tendency encourages policy formulations and military operations 
favoring a collective, multilateral approach to conflict resolution. Nevertheless, enduring 
differences in political and military institutions, national cultures and economic behavior 
still raise barriers to cooperation.     
b. Globalization: Blurring Interests 
Whether globalization, which undeniably affects every stratum of modern 
life and society, is universally beneficial is widely debated among its supporters and 
critics. The integration of world economies, scientific endeavors and communications 
merges different interests that must compromise on political agreements, objectives and 
goals. National militaries are able to learn each other’s organizations, capabilities, 
procedures and ways of thinking to an unprecedented degree. Although such transparency 
reveals weaknesses and problems, it also contributes to common understanding and 
facilitates cooperation and collective crisis management.  
c. Communication and Information Technology 
The rapid evolution of communication and information technology makes 
the ideological indoctrination of developed societies47, such as occurred in Russia and 
Germany in the 20th century, almost impossible. But the gap between democratic, 
economically developed countries and other societies that are still suffering from hunger, 
poverty and political and ideological divisions is widening, and requires close attention. 
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d. Revolution in Military Affairs 
The technological breakthroughs that characterize the revolution in 
military affairs (RMA)48 improved long-distance precision targeting and increased 
accuracy; these developments in turn decreased the side effects, collateral damage and 
risk to friendly forces of modern warfare. This type of warfare could meet realistic 
objectives such as the destruction or disruption of political (civilian) and military 
command, control, communication, and computer networks (C4), air fighting and air 
defense capacities, as well as major economic infrastructure, while ideally leaving 
neighborhoods and vital services largely intact. Some proponents argue that distance 
warfare alone can win wars; others emphasize that without troops on the ground to 
consolidate successes, no victory can be achieved. One thing seems sure: for at least the 
time being, the advantages of the RMA are available chiefly to US forces (and through 
the United States to NATO and the EU), which presents an imbalance in position of 
power. If the RMA becomes widespread (which probably will not happen within the next 
decade), the rules of the game will be changed, and the risk to war-fighters and civilian 
targets in the homeland increased. 
2. Collective Decision-making and Policy Considerations 
The main feature of collective and humanitarian interventions on the policy level 
is the appearance of collective will, interests, goals and objectives. As noted above, the 
effect of non-governmental actors and public opinion on policy making is considerable. 
National policies ideally merge into collective decisions, which then direct military 
action. The actual processes of course are more complicated, and final policies reflect 
some long-term strategic objectives like restoration of peace and order, and nation 
building. A collective policy is more legitimate than a unilateral one. If decision-makers 
take advantage of the wide experience and knowledge available to them, they will more 
easily avoid relying on just one historical precedent or analogy,49 and come to a decision 
as the result of an objective analysis.50 
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Collective policies at the same time are often less direct and clear than might be 
wished, because they reflect bureaucratic procedures of coordination and compromise, 
consensus and trade-off; and they tend to pursue more difficult aims than the overthrow 
of a government or dictator, or winning a total war. This can create a real problem, given 
that a clear, credible and achievable mandate is known to be the basis of successful peace 
operations. Even clear peacemaking policies are hard to accomplish by military means, 
however, as A. L. George (90) points out:   “[A] resounding battlefield success cannot be 
easily converted into a wholly satisfactory political outcome.” 
George defines three types of knowledge policy-makers usually need:  
[First is] conceptualization of strategies – a conceptual framework for each 
of the many different strategies and instruments available to them for 
attempting to influence other states. Secondly general, or generic 
knowledge of each strategy, based on study of past experience that 
identifies the uses and limitations of each strategy and the conditions on 
which its effective employment depends. And finally actor-specific 
behavioral models for sophisticated, insightful understanding of each of 
the state-actors with whom they interact.51 
In addition, policy-makers should take into consideration the legitimacy of action; 
the level of domestic political and public support; the capabilities and limitations of their 
domestic military; the possibility of building an international coalition for a unified 
effort; manning, technical and financial constraints; cost-effectiveness and value 
complexity compared to other important agendas. Other judgments such as short- and 
long-term payoffs, when to be satisfied or to optimize, and when to decide, also play an 
important role in the process.52 The harmonization of desired objectives and available 
resources is mission essential. 
Sufficient knowledge for decision-making requires institutionalized, coordinated 
and shared information gathering; along with data accumulation, analyses, synthesis and 
dissemination. Early warning and policy planning cells with educated and experienced 
staff can transform what often are response-based strategies into preventive policies.  
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Another dilemma is that political (and military) leaders can be indecisive, 
wavering and reluctant to be involved in the post-conflict political, economic and social 
development effort. Peacekeeping operations, however, cannot be ended until peace- or 
nation building has resulted in a secure environment. This fact should be considered at 
the very beginning, by formulating a realistic exit strategy that reflects a willingness to 
pay for success in time and treasure. As a rule of thumb, keeping forces in place is 
cheaper and politically easier than initiating a new intervention if things go wrong 
again.53 
Politicians and military strategists should understand and consider the wide range 
of sources, from political and economic problems through abuses of human rights, out of 
which conflicts arise. Political objectives may be more open to compromise than 
religious, ideological or resource-driven conflicts. The number of conflicting parties, 
their divergence and financial independence, as well as the level of casualties and 
destruction being inflicted, also should affect the planning and execution of peace 
operations.54 Policy should be directed to consensus building. The willingness and ability 
of local authorities to support peacekeeping operations and any subsequent stabilization 
effort is crucial and will affect the timing of the exit strategy. 
The competence and efficiency of policy-makers and military leaders play a 
determining role in the success of operations. The changing peacekeeping environment 
requires a deep understanding of each situation, advanced planning, flexibility and quick 
reactions from the peacekeepers’ side. If a decision is made to go in, the military should 
get full support from their political authorities, which means having a clear mandate on 
the use of force, a sufficient number of peacekeepers with good equipment, effective 
command, control, communication and intelligence arrangements, as well as reliable 
service-support, to reach mission objectives.55 If the military lack any of those support 
requirements, the success of operations will be endangered and the ability of the military 
to be effective defending the mandate, themselves and others will suffer. 
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3. Military Considerations in Peace Operations 
The relationship between politicians and the military plays an important part in 
achieving the goal of a secured environment. As German strategist Otto von Bismarck 
pointed out in the 19th century, “it was not the business of the Army to express opinions 
on political questions.”56 Nevertheless, the military should understand the political 
environment they are entering in order to harmonize their actions with the declared 
political goals, taking into consideration constraints and consequences. Continuous 
communication and information exchange between politicians and military leaders is one 
of the keys for success, contrary to the traditional views of Helmuth von Moltke and his 
followers throughout military history: 
Strategy can only direct its efforts towards the highest goal which the 
means available make attainable. In this way, it aids politics best, working 
only for its objectives, but in its operations independent of it.57 
The operational level is characterized by joint actions, which demand the 
cooperation and support of governmental and non-governmental organizations and 
authorization to use force.  
Somalia and Bosnia clearly illustrated that the objective of stabilizing the 
environment and building peace confronted military forces with new 
challenges.58 
Peace operations by nature are best characterized by the principles of operations 
in low-intensity conflict and limited warfare.59 Those conflicts are usually “transnational” 
in character, involving outside actors and cross-border effects.60 The complexity of tasks 
and risk increase with the volatility of the situation. The basic task is to move the conflict 
from the military to the political arena and keep it there.61 Without the active political, 
logistical and sometimes military support of great power(s) or major regional 
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organizations, and their willingness to accept casualties, the mission objective of 
peacekeeping will be difficult to accomplish.62 
Difficulties in integrating military objectives and political objectives arise 
particularly in limited wars…fought for limited objectives…pursued by 
limited military means. In some limited wars, political leaders impose 
constraints that prevent military leaders from using optimal military 
strategy and tactics, and the result may be a gap between military strategy 
and political objectives.63 
Overlapping national, political and economic interests are at play. Policy makers 
should ask the advice of military professionals, which can improve the outcome of efforts 
to harmonize policies and military operations. The collective approach to policy 
formulation, and multilaterally organized and executed military operations, make the 
conduct of limited warfare especially difficult. 
The evolution in communication and information technology can tempt top 
political and military leaders to micromanage operations. Some even suggest that the 
different levels of war will merge, making it possible to convert tactical success 
immediately into decisive strategic results.64 There are, however, some collective 
(political) objectives in peace operations that can not be realized through military means 
alone, because of the “inescapable limits on the utility of force as an instrument of 
policy” as well as “unforeseen consequences of military victory and unexpected 
developments thereafter.”65 
In peace operations, “settlement, not victory is the ultimate measure of success, 
though settlement is rarely achievable through military efforts alone.”66 Policy makers 
should not neglect the preparation of long-term strategies including post-war stabilization 
and international civil-military cooperation arrangements.  
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There are different doctrines for multilateral operations, adapted by alliances (e.g., 
Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1 of NATO Peace Support Operations, under process of 
ratification) to define principles and standardize tactics, techniques and procedures. Peace 
operations, however, often involve a coalition of forces with different doctrines, 
procedures, capabilities, skills, culture, language and objectives. Those and other 
differences raise problems in the formulation of common strategy, and calls for the 
adaptation of a common peacekeeping doctrine. 
Professional armed forces, even those supported by high technology, are mainly 
structured and trained to fight conventional wars and are not readily prepared for peace 
operations. In order to achieve rapid deployment, pre-selected and pre-trained personnel, 
equipment, and pre-drafted plans and procedures must be in place. Two main types of 
training are required. A general course, built into the professional education of soldiers, 
should deal with the political, economic, and cultural factors and characteristics of 
multilateral, joint operations for low intensity conflict management. The other type of 
training should be conflict and mission specific, held before and during particular 
operations. It should focus on the characteristics of the mission environment, on the 
linkage between political, strategic and operational objectives, and on cooperation with 
other military and civilian organizations. 
Rules of engagement (ROE), even if clearly stated, are possible sources of 
conflict between political authorities and the professional military. These rules are 
intended to limit the use of deadly force, sometimes even at the cost of friendly lives, in 
order to keep the peace. The situation in the field can be so complex, and the time factor 
for decision making so short, that peacekeepers often must make a quick judgment for or 
against adherence to ROE.67 Training and experience are crucial to those who must make 
the right judgment calls.   
The end of the Cold War called for changes in the missions of militaries that in 
turn led to a general trend toward force reduction. Although the political (and logical) 
pressure for force reductions is strongly opposed in some countries (e.g., Russia) by the 
military because of the potential economic and political losses, sooner or later it will have 
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to happen.68 The general shift of focus has been from large conventional armies to more 
expeditionary-type “small professional armies”69 able to use modern information, 
communication and computer technology, and better prepared for peace operations.  
Because of the increased transparency of defense policies and the greater 
supervisory role of public opinion in many countries, the need for citizens’ support in the 
theater of operations cannot be neglected. Good media and public relations are crucial to 
a mission’s success. This means the public should be well informed about the intents and 
goals of operations that are being carried out where they live. Furthermore, the 
relationship between the military and public will change as the security environment 
changes. If citizens have a good reason to believe there is a connection between the 
presence of the military and their own increased security, then social support for the 
military will increase. As one UN report emphasized, “Consent of the local parties, 
impartiality and use of force only in self-defense should remain the bedrock principles of 
peacekeeping.”70 
In operations under a ‘moral’ mandate, it is not an easy task for peacekeepers to 
remain impartial. The conditions upon entry, media coverage and manipulation of the 
situation by local political parties can put politicians and peacekeepers at odds.  
Impartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to the 
principles of the [UN] Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is 
rooted in those Charter principles. Such impartiality is not the same as 
neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time.71 
4. Role of Institutions 
Institutions such as the UN, regional organizations, NGOs and individual states 
are the solid building blocks for the planning, analysis and coordination of decision-
making procedures in peace operations. Their established reputations can contribute to 
the level of transparency, legality and legitimacy of processes and actions. They play an 
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important role in command, control, communication and cooperation, as well as in the 
support of multinational operations. The participation of those institutions could 
determine the success or failure of future peacekeeping missions.  
Hedley Bull defines the possible motives states may have for obeying the rules 
applied to the international security environment.72 First, states will obey international 
law because the rules are believed to have value for themselves. Second, obedience is 
more likely if some form of coercion is available to enforce rules. Third, states will be 
motivated to obey if they believe they will benefit from reciprocal arrangements with 
other states.  
In order to guard peace and human rights as well as guarantee reciprocity (the 
enforcement of standards, norms and behaviors under internationally agreed rules and 
principles) the institutional system should reflect those principles of conduct. That 
requirement is partly fulfilled by the fact that most of the world’s countries signed and 
ratified the UN Charter, and its values and principles influence even those countries that 
did not. Some contradictions in basic principles (e.g., sovereignty vs. guarantee human 
rights), however, need to be clarified and adjusted. 
Although a sovereign state may always resort to “self-help” -- its ability to 
retaliate against violators -- the lack of any coercive power directly controlled by the UN 
decreases the effectiveness of international law enforcement. The system requires 
changes if members wish to make potential violators worry about the possible 
consequences of their actions. The UN remains the basis of legitimacy for enforcement of 
international laws and standards, but under its supervision and the established system of 
checks and balances, regional organizations can and should play a more active role to 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of collective actions. 
Two examples of the increasing responsibilities of regional organizations can be 
found in NATO and the European Union. Both organizations reshaped their institutional 
frameworks in the early 1990s after heated political debates, to answer the new 
challenges of crisis management and peace operations.73 NATO established the 
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Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) as a result, while the EU formed the European 
Security and Defense Identity and Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as other 
new institutions. 
Institutional structures and cultures play important roles in applying preventive 
measures, organizing and conducting peace negotiations and initiating peace operations. 
The broad experience of the UN and international community in conflict management 
offers critical lessons for future success, which should be analyzed and built into the 
institutional system; these are the “formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and 
conventions embedded in the organizational structure”74 of the international community. 
The experience of past UN peace operations highlights the significance of 
institutional arrangements. Several recommendations arise from these lessons learned: 
advisor-observers should be present at peace negotiations; and knowledgeable personnel 
should conduct a preliminary site survey. Countries that are contributing troops should be 
involved in the process of formulating (and revising) the mandate to engage in 
operations,75 and they must be provided with detailed, honest and clear information to the 
extent possible. The coordinated, balanced and harmonious actions of UN organs, 
regional organizations, governments, NGOs, academics, professional experts and the 
business community are indispensable to the conduct of effective planning and 
operations.  
Policy planning and early warning groups should concentrate on strategic issues, 
also using the “best available outside expertise.”76 It is essential that they have access to a 
sophisticated system for the collection, analysis and distribution or sharing of 
information, knowledge and databases.77 
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In policy and strategy making for peace operations, operational planning and 
actual execution are closely interrelated and cannot be separated from the external 
influences of the international community and organizations, as well as public opinion. 
Considerable changes in politics, economics and technology affect global society, nations 
and individuals. Policy makers and military commanders should consider the many 
different implications of their decisions, and must understand that they cannot afford the 
luxury of tunnel vision. They must know and apply the lessons and analogies of the past 
to be more successful in the future. 
Regional organizations play an increasingly important role in humanitarian 
interventions. The international community and public often have legitimized the role of 
these organizations because of their humanitarian objectives and the collective nature of 
their actions. There is a need, however, for clearly defined policy principles and military 
procedures to be applied to collective humanitarian interventions. If those basic 
requirements are not met, the failure of the international community to initiate and lead 
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III. EU POLICIES IN THE BALKANS 1992-‘95 
This chapter demonstrates that the European Union’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (EU CFSP) procedures and institutions were not suitable for reaching 
quick agreements and implementing effective crisis management in the Balkans conflicts 
of 1992-95. Policy-making and implementation were hindered not only by the 
deficiencies of a newly established mechanism but also by the historical differences 
among EU member nations. If the EU fails to improve its internal and external relations 
and CFSP security policies, the establishment of a joint military force, planned for 2003, 
will not change the outcome of future crisis management for the better.  
 Political will is imperative for success. As Steven Larrabee notes, “Crisis 
management is not a question of military mechanisms but of political will. All the 
mechanisms in the world will not help if the determination to use them is lacking.”78  
Although Europe is blessed with political and economic power, it is unable to muster 
enough force behind its policies to assure that European goals will be met in a conflict 
environment. To make the problem even more complex, not even a strong armed force 
can guarantee the resolution of any conflict. 
As the Bosnian case strikingly demonstrates, however, threats appropriate 
to a situation are not easily generated. In this case, as in earlier crises, 
ample military capabilities are available but for various reasons are not 
usable. When policy makers are confronted by a low-level military 
conflict they may face the difficult choice between escalating to higher 
levels of violence or backing down if they lack appropriate and usable 
military options.79 
The basic requirement for a successful collective peace operation is the provision 
of a clear and credible mandate. Without strong political will and unambiguous policy 
directions, the military is not able to define the most suitable strategies and objectives to 
achieve its goals. The Balkan crises revealed that the European Union’s newly 
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established CFSP was not able to work out effective, commonly agreed policies, much 
less their implementation. 
This chapter is organized into two main sections. The first one will briefly 
introduce the development of EU CFSP crisis management tools, and explore the 
problems that arose during their implementation in the Yugoslav conflict between 1992 
and 1995. The second section will examine the effects of EU policies on its peacekeeping 
effort, internal evolution and external relationships. 
A. THE EU CFSP IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1992 TO 1995: DEVELOPMENT, 
OBJECTIVES AND TOOLS  
Based on twenty years’ experience in political cooperation, in 1992 the members 
of the European Union committed themselves to the creation of a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, mainly as a response to German unification and the end of the Cold 
War.80 The situation in the Balkans, which was heating up rapidly at the time, forced the 
EU to act without the opportunity to adjust its new procedures and institutions to meet 
these difficult challenges.        
1. EU CFSP Development 
From the time the European Community (EC) was established, its essentially 
economic nature was matched by a strong political element, officially declared at the 
Hague Summit in December 1969. The idea of forming a European Defense Community 
(EDC) already had been introduced in the so-called Pleven Plan of 1950, to give the EC a 
more weighty role in foreign affairs, and also as a stealthy means to incorporate German 
military forces into Trans-Atlantic security institutions.81 After the new EDC Treaty 
already had been ratified by many member states, however, opponents in France were 
able to delay debate, and the treaty never made it to the agenda of the National Assembly. 
The subsequently adopted Western European Union (WEU) served as a forum for 
cooperation on defense issues separate from Community institutions that, in the early 
1960s, were still weak and based mainly on national decision-making procedures. In 
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1970, WEU member states agreed to consult one another on foreign policy matters (the 
Luxembourg Report), and refined the process of coordination, supported by institutional 
arrangements established at the Paris Summit of 1974. The policy integration process 
reached an important milestone in 1983 with an agreement on joint actions on major 
foreign policy issues known as the Solemn Declaration. The Single European Act (SEA) 
in 1986 tied together the EC and European Political Cooperation (EPC), in order to 
formulate and implement foreign policies jointly, but still not in common.82 
The CFSP was born in 1992 with the adoption of the Treaty of European Union 
(TEU) at Maastricht. One of the main objectives of the TEU was to reinforce the EU’s 
“identity on the international scene in particular through the implementation of common 
foreign and security policy….”83 
The main objectives of the CFSP are the safeguarding of the values, interests and 
independence of the Union; strengthening member’s security; preserving peace and 
strengthening international security in accordance with the United Nations Charter, the 
Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter; promoting international cooperation; and 
developing and consolidating democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.84 
Policies under those criteria would be implemented through obligatory 
consultation and information exchange by member states. Members hoped to exert their 
combined influence by deciding on common strategies, adopting joint actions and 
formulating common positions. They also expected national policies to correspond with 
these commonly adopted positions through coordinated, harmonized and consistent 
actions.85 
Articles 13 and 14 of the Consolidated TEU Version defines the procedures, 
institutional set-up and responsibilities for adopting joint actions. As an important 
innovation, the Council of the EU had the right to determine when qualified majority 
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voting could be applied instead of unanimous decisions. In a December 1993 meeting, 
however, the European Council agreed on a rule to avoid majority voting for the time 
being.86 
The CFSP mechanism became operational in a difficult strategic environment that 
challenged the formulation of a common approach. In addition to the conflict underway 
in Bosnia, France was engaged in Zaire and Rwanda, while Spain was preoccupied with 
Morocco and the stability of North Africa. EU member states found their opinions and 
priorities divided by their geographical and political diversity, and their different 
interests. The issue of enlargement, the debate on roles and responsibilities in the Trans-
Atlantic security system, and the informal “hand-shake” agreement among NATO 
members on Balkan conflict management further complicated the situation. The 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union in 1991 created an entirely new 
security environment that required both political and military structures across Europe to 
adapt quickly, and raised concerns about the problems of nuclear safety in the new 
independent states. Despite those difficulties and concerns, France, Germany and Britain 
played key roles in improving the importance and efficiency of the CFSP.87 
2. EU Policies in the Balkans 
The European Community responded to the changes in East and Central Europe 
with the establishment of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), in May 1990. The bank provided economic and financial support (PHARE, 
TEMPUS) to states in an individualized way.88 As Archer and Butler note (182), the EC 
provided humanitarian aid to the Balkan countries, and had a trade relationship with 
Yugoslavia that merged with political elements after 1991. Overall, between 1991 and 
1998 the EU directed 255.22 million Euro in humanitarian aid (ECHO) into former 
Yugoslavia.89 
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The Yugoslav crisis caught the European Union and other security organizations 
that were in the process of change by surprise. One example of the EU’s poor situation 
analysis was the signing of a loan agreement with the Yugoslav government just before 
Slovenia and Croatia declared independence.90 
Yugoslavia has presented the international community with all possible 
types of armed conflict and commitment. Civil wars, wars of secession, 
inter-state wars and wars of territorial conquest have combined on the 
ground to justify the successive or simultaneous recourse to traditional 
peacekeeping operations (in Croatia) and humanitarian intervention 
(Bosnia), mixed with a dash of peace enforcement (Serbia), an attempt at 
prevention (Macedonia) and a systematic pretence of impartiality.91 
The overall management of the various Balkan crises highlighted the external 
policy shortcomings of the CFSP. Initially, EU policymakers focused their efforts on 
keeping the Yugoslav federation together. To do this, they applied two basic approaches, 
mediation and impartiality, that shifted to enforcement from 1992. As Gnesotto (3) put it, 
the driving idea of conflict management was non-intervention translated into a “strategy 
of abstention.” In the early phase of the conflict, the EU became involved in four major 
ways. First, EU members initiated a number of conferences in which they sought to find a 
peaceful settlement. They wanted to bring Serbia to a political agreement, but at the same 
time hoped to avoid a partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, out of concern that such an 
outcome would lead to the emergence of an expansionist greater Serbia and a greater 
Croatia.92 
The eagerness to find a peaceful settlement was also reflected in a plethora of 
peace plans drawn up or supported by the Western Europeans: the Vance-Owen plan of 
25 March 1993; the Kinkel-Juppé initiative of 8 November 1993; the EU's action plan of 
22 November 1993; and the peace plan of the international Contact Group of 6 July 1994. 
Neither the organization of peace conferences nor the introduction of peace plans had 
much positive effect. It seemed the Western European states did not or could not exercise 
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enough pressure to enforce a peaceful solution, especially as their intentions and 
neutrality also were came into question.93 
The West's policy of neutrality was far from being adopted immediately: 
in the first six months of the crisis, in 1991, American, British and French 
diplomacy was fairly pro-Serb, whereas Germany was more susceptible to 
Slovene and Croatian claims. (During his electoral campaign and in the 
first days of his presidency, Bill Clinton for his part gave the impression of 
being rather more sensitive to Bosnian interests). It was only during a 
second phase, from the moment that the United Nations appeared on the 
scene, that mediation and dialogue with all the parties to the conflict 
became the official line followed by all Western countries.94 
Second, the EU attempted to arrange cease-fire agreements between the warring 
parties, and sent unarmed observers to the field; these, however, failed to produce the 
desired effect, did not prevent the continuation of fighting and did not decrease the level 
of violence. For its third strategy, the EU initiated and applied sanctions against Serbia 
under various UNSC resolutions, to be monitored by the WEU and NATO.95 Those 
sanctions ranged from an arms embargo through limits on trade to a ban on commercial 
over-flights. Although the EU did not apply its own sanctions until October 1994,96 it did 
decide to provide regular humanitarian aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina beginning in 
1993.97 None of the imposed economic policies and sanctions, however, were enough to 
stop the fighting. 
In the end, as a result of German efforts and as its final strategy to end the war, 
the EU recognized the separate states of the former Yugoslavia to be republics.98 The 
policies to recognize new entities were the product of member states’ national 
approaches, driven by their interests. As Jopp (2) argues, the result was controversial: 
while it may have contributed to the Croatian settlement, for Bosnia recognition could 
actually have played a role in the outbreak of fighting. 
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The hesitation and changing opinions of EU members, from initial insistence on 
preserving the Yugoslav state as an entity to the later application of sanctions against 
Serbia and Montenegro, undermined the credibility of the EU as a regional arbiter of 
conflict. On the whole, Western Europe's responses “were inadequate, its decisions were 
on many occasions overtaken by events, and action taken either too late or half-
hearted.”99 
Those policies failed mainly because of the lack of unity and coherence, well-
defined common interests, objectives or decision-making institutions within the EU. The 
failure revealed the problems of consensus rule, where strong member states can 
influence the common policy (e.g., German recognition of Slovenia and Croatia) and 
weaker ones can block decisions (e.g., the Greek veto of recognition for Macedonia). As 
a result, EU policies often “ended up as the lowest common dominator”100 among 
members instead of the best one for the situation, which as a rule also is usual for NATO 
decisions. Those internal differences softened the impact of the EU and harmed its 
credibility. 
Archer and Butler (183) provide further examples of the differences in EU 
members’ national policies. Germany, for example, unilaterally provided political and 
economic support to Croatia during the conflict and after the settlement. Greece had a 
bilateral dispute with Macedonia and applied sanctions against it despite other EU 
members’ intentions. By the same token, from the EU camp only Greece kept up friendly 
relations with Serbia and Montenegro.  
The EU did not apply comprehensive common policies for the settlement of the 
crisis in the early 1990s. It also failed to introduce effective joint actions that would bring 
a settlement to the Balkan conflict. As a matter of fact, the first six joint actions were 
adopted only at the Brussels EU Council on 29 October 1993, and three more in mid-
1995. Only one of the actions, support for the “peace process and humanitarian relief in 
former-Yugoslavia,” was even related directly to the Yugoslav crises.101 By this means, 
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the EU intended to increase its contributions to the work of the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees, and also took on responsibility for the administration of Mostar.102 
Another Joint Action had an indirect effect as it sponsored the inaugural 
conference for a peace and stability pact, which was designed to provide a 
forum for the resolution of ethnic and border disputes within Europe – the 
so-called Balladur Pact.103 
The desire of Central and Eastern European countries to improve economic 
relations with European Community brought some initial success to this joint action 
reaching agreement on the main issues. However it seemed in 1994 that collective 
security did not really exist in Europe, or at least not at the same level for everybody, as it 
effectively increased from south to north and from east to west. Observing the crisis 
escalation, Henry Kissinger noted that “Western democracies, with the best of intentions, 
made the likely inevitable.”104 
Although Western European crisis management was openly and widely criticized, 
most analysts agreed that no feasible solution to the Yugoslav crises existed. Although 
the EU is blamed for the failure, it was not the only organization that bore responsibility. 
The policies of the various international organizations involved in the crises (i.e., the UN, 
NATO, WEU and EU) moved from “‘the lowest common dominator’ to increasingly 
controversial initiatives.”105 Those organizations, like the EU, not only lacked consistent 
principles and effective coordination, but they clung to different ideas on how to 
approach conflict management, ranging from mediation to intervention, based largely on 
individual national interests and initiatives. 
The collective failure of these regional and international institutions to 
deal with Yugoslavia’s disintegration was due to many factors, including 
institutional incompetence and overconfidence. But at bottom, it was a 
failure of the major powers, which used the institutions in an attempt to 
obfuscate their own unwillingness to employ the right combination of 
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diplomacy and force to end the fighting. In the end, it was a failure of the 
United States, first in deferring to the Europeans while failing to back 
them up, and then in trying to intervene with half-measures designed more 
to limit risks than to have an impact on the ground.106 
B.  THE EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS ON EU POLICIES 
The Bosnian crises affected not only Trans-Atlantic relations and the foreign 
relations of the EU, but also EU CFSP development and ties among EU members. The 
next section reviews those effects in more detail. 
1. Effects on Peacekeeping 
Even though Union-wide decisions were rarely reached, the very size and 
political-economic capacity of the EU ensured it would be an important player in the 
international area, whose views and opinions could not be ignored.107 There were some 
positive elements to the Western European effort in the Balkans: it contributed to the 
containment of the crisis, and indirectly, brought the UN, NATO and others, into the 
peacemaking effort.  
In retrospect, Western Europe developed at least a clear minimum 
strategy: this consisted of a combination of external levers (economic 
sanctions and the arms embargo), permanent negotiations with the 
conflicting parties and some interference with their operational freedom of 
maneuver through the presence of peacekeeping forces. In addition, 
Western Europe supported the control and enforcement of the `no-fly' ban 
over Bosnia-Herzegovina, the establishment of security zones and the 
selective use of air power.108 
Gnesotto (3) explains that those inconsistent strategies had some further partial 
successes, in that they preserved European unity and promoted cooperation with third 
players; prevented the conflict from spreading and protected large numbers of civilians in 
so-called safe zones. Other objectives (e.g., keeping the federation together) were 
changed or abolished in the process. Significantly, the efforts at cooperation by the EC 
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and WEU also helped prevent the major Western European states from returning to 
classical power or alliance policies towards the Balkans.109 
2. Effects on EU’s Foreign Relations (NATO, US, OSCE, Russia, Partners, 
Islamic Countries) 
Similarly to the hardships of reaching common decisions internally, the EU has 
found it difficult to negotiate and make agreements with third partners as well.110 It has 
become apparent that European Union and European security institutions will have to 
define each member’s role and shared responsibilities more clearly, to handle new type of 
security challenges (i.e. ethnic conflicts, refugee migration, violations of human rights 
and international humanitarian law) that “may involve political, military, economic, 
social, environmental and even cultural elements.”111 
As Jopp (2) put it: 
Western Europe also drew some consequences from its failures, as it 
recognized the difficulties in finding any solution to the crisis without the 
involvement of the United States and Russia; hence the forming of the 
Contact Group as proposed by Britain. 
The United States initially was divided on the necessary level of involvement in 
the crisis, as major national interests seemingly were not at stake. The United States also 
expected that its European allies could and must handle the problem alone. The crises 
revealed great differences between American and West European views related to five 
main issues. First, at an early stage, Europeans accepted the Vance-Owen plan for a 
federation of Yugoslavia, divided into ten ethnically contained cantons, as the most likely 
solution for the crisis. The United States followed European policies such as the 
recognition of secessionist states from a distance, but refused more active diplomatic 
involvement. Washington regarded the introduction of the Vance-Owen plan as an 
illegitimate attempt to legitimize the gains of the Serbs.112 On the same day (March 25, 
1993) that the Bosnian Muslims and Croats signed the Vance-Owen plan, US decision-
makers held a Principal Committee meeting to discuss the situation and come up with 
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new ideas.113 This was a clear sign of US expectations that the plan would fail, but the 
expressed US desire to seek different solutions itself undermined any future chance for 
the plan’s supporters to succeed. 
Second, after long debates about this and other options, on May 1 1993, the 
United States proposed a military ‘lift and strike’ strategy.114 This was opposed by most 
Europeans, who worried about their troops’ safety on the ground and preferred instead to 
continue with negotiations and humanitarian measures.115 Third, US reluctance to send 
ground forces to Bosnia called into question the US commitment to European security, 
and annoyed those Europeans who felt they were doing the ‘dirty job’ alone. Jopp (5) 
points out that this became a major issue both in the domestic arenas and between the 
United States and its allies. Fourth, Washington saw the European initiative to lift 
sanctions against Serbia in return for a peace settlement as a desire for “peace at any 
price.” And fifth, America’s ‘benign neglect’ policy on peace negotiations from 1993 
until the Sarajevo incident in 1994 brought France and Britain to a common 
understanding that they must get the United States more involved in diplomatic efforts.116 
The slaughter of civilians in downtown Sarajevo accomplished that purpose. 
On February 5, an artillery shell landed in a crowded Sarajevo 
marketplace, killing 68 and wounding about 200 others. In a meeting that 
afternoon with his foreign policy advisers, President Clinton expressed 
outrage and sought ideas how to respond…. As a result, (of earlier 
discussions with allies) during two painstaking meetings, the principals 
reworked the French ideas in a way that would permit enforcement of the 
protected zone (around Sarajevo) without the deployment of additional 
ground forces. The modified plan reduced the weapons exclusion zone 
(from thirty kilometers) to a twenty-kilometer radius and required the 
parties (including the Bosnian Muslims) to withdraw or place under UN 
control all heavy weapons within ten days, or face air strikes. In the 
interim, any further attacks on civilians within the demilitarized zone 
would be met with immediate air strikes.117 
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Through the Contact Group (France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and 
the United States) US diplomats brokered a federation agreement between Bosnian 
Muslims and Croats, and accelerated the search for ways to reach a settlement. The 
conflict revealed the dispute within the United States between internationalist and 
nationalist views. These arguments led to strict conditions being set on the use of 
American forces for peace and other operations, guided mainly by US national interests 
and a multilateral approach. The White House announced its intention to work more 
closely with the House and Senate in the future to iron out differences. Presidential 
Directive 25, in 1994, required clear political objectives for any intervention and a 
mandate that US forces would operate mainly under US command.118 
There also was a growing tendency in EU-OSCE relations for the two bodies to 
complement each other’s functions and roles in peacekeeping.119 Nevertheless, the 
inability of EU members to find a commonly agreed-upon comprehensive solution to the 
widening Balkans crisis further undermined its credibility as an institution. 
West European countries’ problems in finding common 
approaches…underlined the point that it is not always appropriate to deal 
directly with the EU. Internal division…encouraged external partners to 
concentrate on individual countries in Western Europe.120 
At the same time, various members’ (i.e., Russia and Turkey) expectations about 
the role of western security institutions differed widely.121 The development of the CFSP 
was made even more difficult by members’ tendency to think in bilateral terms and direct 
their efforts toward strengthening ties among individual EU members instead of building 
up community institutions. Most of the EU’s external partners either did not have 
effective tools in hand or did not have the political will to interfere in the management of 
the conflict, and so tended to apply policies close to those of Western Europe. 
Russia, Serbia’s strongest supporter, was too busy dealing with its own internal 
political, military and economic problems to force changes in Western policies toward 
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the conflict. Although Moscow criticized the recognition of secessionist Yugoslav 
republics, it was not in a position to dictate policy and probably did not want to 
jeopardize its newly established relationship with the West. Furthermore, as a result of 
the breakup of the Soviet Union, some Russian political factions upheld the right of 
national self-determination as a general principle, and were in the mood to accept the 
legitimacy of Yugoslav successor states.122 
The Yeltsin administration, however, saw its claims of anti-Serbian bias in 
European policies justified by the increasing involvement of NATO during 1994. Russia 
seemingly was moving towards a “less cooperative and more self-assertive” policy.123 
The establishment of the Contact Group addressed this problem by providing an 
opportunity to Russia to express its concerns and become an active participant in strategy 
formulation.124 
The Central European countries, for their part, not only lacked the resources to 
formulate and implement individual policies toward Yugoslavia, but also wanted to 
develop closer ties with Western Europe in hope of future integration into its institutions. 
They saw the crisis as a test case for how the West would deal with future actual or 
potential problems in the region.125 
Muslim countries also criticized Western Europe’s policies towards Bosnia, 
which fed into Islamic fundamentalism and rising anti-Western sentiments. The Islamic 
criticism of Europe's policy again was based on intra-European differences on how to 
deal with the crisis.  
Europe's lack of political determination...was explained by the absence of 
any EU member's vital national interests in the case of former 
Yugoslavia…. Explicit manifestations of the argument of conspiracy 
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against Muslims were widely found among militant Islamic groups, which 
related Europe's Bosnian policy to long-standing enmity towards Islam.126 
The main policy implications of the Yugoslav crisis in Muslim countries were the 
“conducive spread of negative perceptions towards Western Europe,” the use of the 
Bosnian tragedy for domestic gains by fundamentalist Islamic groups and a decrease in 
Europe’s credibility as a reliable political and security partner.127 
The Yugoslav crises revealed the problems that security organizations, which 
were formulated to deal with war-type defense scenarios, were having difficulty with 
mission definition. Neither Article 5 of NATO’s charter nor Article V of the WEU treaty 
was applicable to crisis management, one reason that decision making tended to drift to 
the national level. Gnesotto (13) argues that the biggest challenge so far has been to 
define principles and mechanism that are suitable for common policy-making and 
managing multilateral military operations under constraints of limited space, intensity 
and objectives. 
As there was no planned division of tasks between NATO and the WEU, both 
played roles in the Balkans peacekeeping missions. 
Both organizations have unanimously authorized themselves to execute 
UN and CSCE mandates. WEU participated collectively in surveillance of 
the embargo in the Adriatic (beginning in July 1992) before combining its 
fleet with a similar NATO fleet on 8 June 1993.... It was also the WEU 
which, in autumn 1991, proposed options for the first UN peacekeeping 
operation (UNPROFOR I) and these plans were in the end adopted by the 
United Nations in preference to those of NATO, which were considered 
unsuited, because of their scope, to the political specificity and aims of the 
operation.128 
As a result of its experiences in Somalia and Yugoslavia beginning in April 1993, 
France began participating once again in the NATO Military Committee, which proposed 
operational plans for Bosnian air-strikes to the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the highest 
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political authority of NATO. NATO and the WEU agreed on procedures for 
implementation of UNSC Resolution 836 under the authority of the UN Security Council. 
This resolution provided for liaison and command control arrangements among the WEU, 
NATO and UNPROFOR, and worked out joint operational plans. These kinds of 
practical arrangements demonstrated that it was possible for EU members to establish a 
single European security system adaptable to multinational cooperation.129 
In the long run, the Yugoslav crisis changed Europe’s foreign relations for the 
better. It led to the more active participation of NATO in European security beyond its 
territory and the scope of missions envisioned by Article 5. It resulted in better 
cooperation between the WEU (and France) and NATO. The conflict forced the 
European partners and institutions to revise and reformulate their roles and capabilities 
(or lack thereof). The introduction of NATO European Security and Defense Identity and 
the Combined Joint Task Forces, to facilitate burden sharing and avoiding duplication of 
effort, made NATO (and US) mechanisms and assets available to the WEU. NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace program, the creation of associate partnerships in the WEU, and the 
establishment of a link between the CFSP and Central European countries, were all major 
steps toward cooperative security in Europe, even if effective security management 
remained missing from the agenda.130 
3. Effects on Internal Relationships, CFSP Development, and Institutional 
Changes (EU, WEU) 
The series of crises in the former Yugoslavia revealed problems and weaknesses 
within Western Europe, such as the limits in the European allies’ resources, and political-
historic constraints that prevented some members (e.g., Germany) from participating in 
broader peacekeeping missions. The EU proved to be an inadequate forum for bringing 
all its members to consensus on policy toward the Balkans; it nevertheless was effective 
at the less demanding task of implementing sanctions against the aggressor Serbian 
regime.131 
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The West European states were divided by severe disagreements over 
what were the necessary policies to adopt toward the conflict. For 
example, France and Germany’s proposal to send an inter-positioning 
force to Eastern Croatia met with strong opposition, while the effort to 
agree on and win international support for sanctions took most of a 
year.132 
The inability of EU members to work out effective common policies to solve the 
Bosnia crises strengthened the argument for a federalist approach to reinforce community 
identity and, with increasing economic interdependence, move toward a stronger political 
union. Three important and necessary steps in this direction were the appointment of a 
capable executive recognized by the community; the reinforcement of the democratic 
legitimacy of common decisions; and the establishment of a sophisticated community 
bureaucracy.133 To be effective, the CFSP requires cooperation and joint management of 
activities in all three of these branches.134 Despite all their disagreements, EU member 
states shared the opinion that collective action under a common policy would likely be 
more effective than individual policymaking.135 
As a sign of the changing attitudes toward the CFSP, a new Directorate General 
(DG1A) for External Political Relations was established within the Commission in 
1993.136 Members defined six important elements of the CFSP: it should be pro-active 
rather than reactive; it should operate with unity and coherence; it should involve all 
aspects of security; joint actions should be in line with Article J.3. TEU; the CFSP should 
have world-vide visibility and legitimacy; and it should have a more effective decision-
making process.137 The principle of qualified majority voting seems to be the best way to 
improve decision-making, but it requires support from members with more nationalist 
ideas. The identity, exact nature and shared value system, as well as the financial 
arrangements of the EU also need refining.138 
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The Yugoslav crises clearly showed Europe’s dependence on NATO and the 
United States. US policies toward European security issues became less predictable, and 
American intervention rekindled the old problem about the assignment of leadership in 
Western Europe. The other major issue is burden sharing: namely, who is paying for 
what?139 The EU treaty referred to the WEU as “the defense component of the EU and as 
a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance,” but in reality it had 
no military force.140 The Bosnian experience changed the attitude of Britain and others 
toward the role and importance of the WEU. But despite growing French, German, 
Spanish and Belgian support for progress toward the Maastricht Treaty, movement had 
been minimal until 1996, when a planning cell was established and the WEU enlarged to 
include states other than EU members.  
The NATO concept of Combined Joint Task Forces and policies to avoid 
duplication of effort and unhealthy competition enabled the WEU to run military 
operations with NATO logistical assets. In truth, however, EU members were not likely 
to engage in military action without US participation, as in Bosnia.141 Although no one 
questioned NATO’s responsibility for command of air operations, many agreed that the 
command of naval operations was a possible WEU mission, in light of its successful 
participation in the implementation of sanctions against Yugoslavia.142 
Although the EU played a useful role in coordinating diplomatic efforts 
for crisis management, it has its limitations, especially when military crisis 
management is required.143  
As a matter of fact, effective conflict prevention costs much less than crisis 
management, so the development of early warning systems, policy planning and analysis 
capabilities and collective decision-making and strategy implementation make for sound 
policy. 
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The inadequacies of international law, which recognize only inter-state relations 
while ruling out interference in domestic affairs, paralyzed the EU for a while. The cases 
of the Kurdish people in Iraq and the civil war in Somalia proved that “the right to 
interfere or the duty to assist … (are) neither easy nor universally agreed.” Gnesotto (3) 
argues that German eagerness to recognize Croatia and Slovenia may be explained as an 
attempt to provide a legal basis for international involvement. But it also can be seen as a 
sign of internal divergences, different principles and values as well as problems of 
individual members’ reactions on behalf of their own national interests. In the long term, 
moral judgements are going to be indispensable to these kinds of situations, wherever 
they take place.144 The big challenge for the EU (and the rest of the international 
community) will be to clarify common moral values and principles, and define precisely 
what is legitimate or unacceptable, even in domestic affairs. 
The Yugoslav experience seemingly reinforced the objectives of the CFSP. The 
EU has started to adjust its institutional architecture, mechanisms and procedures for 
close consultation to develop cohesion and solidarity on security issues. It also should 
look for ways to improve cooperation with external security organizations, both in 
Europe and beyond. As John Newhouse wrote, “Europeans and Americans have been 
talking without really communicating.”145 The same observation can be applied to 
European relations with other partners, as the long process to legitimize sanctions shows.  
 
The crises that rocked Yugoslavia and its successors in the 1990s made very clear 
that the EU CFSP at that time was not prepared to formulate and apply effective common 
positions and joint actions. Its institutions and decision-making processes were 
insufficient to overcome the different views, principles and interests of its member states, 
and these internal divergences, along with external pressures, ultimately led the EU’s 
initiatives and peace plans to fail. Although the European Union was an economic power, 
it did not utilize all the advantages of the ‘power of the purse’ to contribute to crises 
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prevention and management, nor did European military forces deployed in the crises 
reach the visibility required to compel peace settlements. 
Despite its ambitions, the EU simply was not ready to take greater responsibility 
for European security in the 1990s. If its members want it to assume such responsibility 
in the future, they first must resolve the problem of Trans-Atlantic task and responsibility 
sharing. This will require a reevaluation of interests and common objectives, as well as a 
division of labor and liability between Europeans and Americans. Only then can 
questions about the necessary level of European security and defense capabilities, as well 
as the future development of military forces, be answered. 
Now that the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force will soon be operational, it seems 
important to learn from others’ experience about the hardships and limitations of 
applying military force to manage Petersberg-type scenarios. The next chapter reviews 
some of the gaps between the political and military objectives of NATO’s IFOR and 
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IV.  THE GAP BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES  
This chapter discusses the thesis that the military objectives of the 
Implementation Force (IFOR) of the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia, and the Kosovo 
air campaign of 1999 were not strongly tied to the declared or implied political goals of 
NATO, the European Union or the United Nations going into the conflict. Although 
NATO military forces managed to accomplish their military objectives and acquired 
considerable experience in the Balkans, there were several gaps between policies and 
operations. Those gaps were the result not only of the historic differences between the 
nature of politics and the military, but also the difficulties of using force to accomplish 
limited, political objectives. 
For the most part, these difficulties (in civil-military relations) arise from 
the complex nature of modern peace operations and a number of obstacles, 
misunderstandings and other dilemmas that confront militia and civilian 
members of a mission who come from different professional backgrounds 
and cultures and have to perform their task amid conflicting priorities.146 
This chapter focuses on three core differences between political and military 
planning for peace operations. First, policies are deliberately somewhat ambiguously 
phrased, mirroring the complexity of the decision-making environment and processes. By 
contrast, military strategies and objectives should be as clear and direct as possible, to 
enable detailed operation planning and implementation. Second, policies are 
philosophical, in the sense that they express an ideal broad vision held by decision-
makers -- a unified state as a goal, for example -- while the means to overcome practical 
difficulties and realize the goal are not (and cannot be) considered in detail. The military 
should translate those visions into practically accomplishable objectives within the 
political constrains and limits of authorized resources and capacities. Third, political 
authorities should facilitate and control the exact interpretation of their policies into 
supporting military operations through clear command and control arrangements. This 
leads to the old problematic debate on the necessary level of civilian control over military 
planning and implementation. 
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If the EU wants to make its military forces capable of conducting successful 
peace operations as soon as possible, it should learn from the NATO-led operations in 
Bosnia and Kosovo. NATO provides probably the best analogy for lessons learned 
because many of the EU countries are also NATO members, and because the EU 
inherited from the WEU established working procedures and arrangements for 
cooperation and task sharing with NATO. 
By examining issues related to the management of low-intensity conflict and 
coalition warfare in the IFOR operation and Kosovo air campaign, the chapter will 
demonstrate a range of similarities and differences in the difficult transformation of 
policies into military objectives. 
A.  POLITICAL GOALS, MILITARY OBJECTICVES 
Interestingly enough, Max Boot in his book Savage Wars of Peace and Eliot A. 
Cohen in Supreme Command, both based on historical case studies of the US military, 
identify the military as the main institutional barrier to interventionist policies within the 
national security establishment. 
The obstructionist attitude of military commanders toward sending and leading 
troops into peace enforcement missions becomes more easily understood in light of the 
ambiguous relationship between political goals and military objectives. The debate in the 
late 1980s between former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and then Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger on the use of force clearly illustrates the different approaches 
of political and military leaders. Alexander L. George summarizes the essence of 
Weinberger’s post-Vietnam doctrine: 
Rather [than the Clausewitzian view], the new doctrine argued, use of 
force in support of foreign policy must give way, if necessary, to military 
requirements for the effective, efficient use of force.147 
Political objectives in peace enforcement operations are usually directed to bring 
the conflict settlement from the ‘battlefield’ to the political stage and keep it there. One of 
the key factors of any final settlement is the strong, preferably democratic, legitimacy of 
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after-conflict national institutions. An international military force has severe limitations 
on the ways it can support those political objectives. The NATO draft doctrine on Peace 
Support Operations emphasizes that the link between military and political objectives 
should be tight. Military objectives typically focus on the enforcement of preconditions to 
further a political settlement and are directed to areas such as separating and disarming 
the belligerents, and creating a buffer zone. The aim of peace enforcement operations 
“…will not be the defeat or destruction of an enemy, but rather to compel or coerce any 
or all parties to comply with a particular course of action.”148 Those military missions are 
conducted in the context of a broader political, cultural, historic and economic 
environment. The success of operations depends not only on the military effort but also 
on the complex relationship of all national and international factors at play. 
Although the cessation of fighting is an essential precondition for achieving long-
term strategies, it is only the very beginning step in the much longer process of resolving 
the core causes of hostility, building confidence between hostile parties, and creating the 
basic conditions for order and a peaceful future. This broader scope of policies can partly 
be supported with military means, but the main burden rests on the involvement and 
contributions of the full range of institutions and actors other than the military. On the 
European continent, the experiences of the Bosnian and Kosovo missions provide good 
examples of the tension between political and military objectives. As General Wesley 
Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. 
European Command (USEUCOM) in the Kosovo engagement, concludes: 
At the political levels, clear, realistic aims are essential. Greater attention 
must be given to the integration of civilian and military activities. Military 
activities on the ground must reinforce civilian aims, within the limits 
imposed by military capabilities and resources. It must also be recognized 
that intervention to enforce peace will never be neutral; some parties will 
always be more heavily impacted than others, and all will attempt to use 
the force to advance their political aims. The civilian components of such 
missions will also be heavily dependent upon the military for security and 
enforcement of their decisions.149 
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1. The Case of Bosnia: the IFOR Experience 
The General Framework Agreement (GFA)150 for peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, generally referred to as the Dayton Peace Accords, signed on November 
21, 1995 in Dayton, Ohio, outlined the main political and military objectives of the 
various parties to the conflict. 
Annex 4 of the GFA outlined political objectives, in particular a new constitution. 
It defined Bosnia and Herzegovina as one sovereign state within its present 
internationally recognized borders, consisting of two entities: a Federation and a Bosnian 
Serb Republic. The GFA also outlined the institutional set-up of the state, as well as the 
basic functions and responsibilities of its legislature and executive branch. The protection 
of human rights and basic freedoms had a central role in the text.  
Two other important requirements were also emphasized in the text. The first was 
the suggested goal of bringing justice to aggressors in the form of a war crimes tribunal. 
The second was the organization of civilian aspects of implementation, such as 
humanitarian aid, economic reconstruction, protection of human rights and the holding of 
free elections as described in Annex 10. In this process, however, the UN High 
Representative had no authority over the IFOR Commander. 
The main military objectives laid out in the GFA were  
…bringing about and maintaining an end to hostilities; separating the 
armed forces of Bosnia’s two newly created entities, the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska; transferring territory 
between the two entities according to the peace agreement; and moving 
the parties’ forces and heavy weapons into approved storage sites.151 
These were derived mainly from Annex 1-A of the GFA:  
• The cease-fire that began with the agreement of October 5, 1995 will 
continue. 
• Foreign combatant forces currently in Bosnia are to be withdrawn 
within 30 days. 
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• The parties must complete withdrawal of forces behind a zone of 
separation of approximately 4 km within an agreed period. Special 
provisions relate to Sarajevo and Gorazde.  
• As a confidence-building measure, the parties agree to withdraw heavy 
weapons and forces to cantonment/barracks areas within an agreed 
period and to demobilize forces, which cannot be accommodated in 
those areas. 
• The agreement invites into Bosnia and Herzegovina a multinational 
military Implementation Force, the IFOR, under the command of 
NATO, with a grant of authority from the UN.  
• The IFOR will have the right to monitor and help ensure compliance 
with the agreement on military aspects and fulfill certain supporting 
tasks. The IFOR will have the right to carry out its mission vigorously, 
including with the use of force as necessary. It will have unimpeded 
freedom of movement, control over airspace, and status of forces 
protection. 
• A Joint Military Commission is established, to be chaired by the IFOR 
Commander. Persons under indictment by the International War 
Crimes Tribunal cannot participate. 
• Information on mines, military personnel, weaponry and other items 
must be provided to the Joint Military Commission within agreed 
periods. 
• All combatants and civilians must be released and transferred without 
delay in accordance with a plan to be developed by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross.152 
Analyzing the text of the GFAP, it becomes apparent that the observation of 
Raymond Aron about the nature of treaties is justified:  “You can find what you want to 
find in the treaties all that you need is a selection of quotations, supported by personal 
prejudice.”153 The ambiguity that permeates treaties and agreements contributes to 
different interpretations not only among politicians and interest groups but in the minds 
of military leaders as well. 
Military thinkers like to plan for perfect operations, in which there are 
clear objectives, unambiguous political guidance, ‘mission-type’ orders, a 
defined exit strategy, and popular consensus at home.154 
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As is apparent from the text of the GFA, policy and operations fail to agree on the 
time period envisioned to reach their objectives. The defined political objectives required 
a long-term engagement and effort, while military objectives as drafted needed a much 
shorter term to accomplish. Here the link between policies and operations is not direct, as 
implementing the military objectives did not lead directly to realization of final policy 
goals. But the success of military operations themselves was a prerequisite for the 
utilization of further political and other means. The political objectives envisioned 
restoration of order and a functioning state under legitimate executive and legislative 
institutions, with guaranteed human rights for all citizens. Although those political 
objectives were not separated in time into different phases, military operations obviously 
could focus initially only on the restoration of peace and order through the enforced 
separation of former belligerents. All the other political objectives required the effort of 
other, mainly civilian participants, in which the military played only a secondary role. In 
that later phase, matching the sharing of responsibilities and tasks to priorities, resources 
and capabilities, as well as defining clear military objectives, were made harder by the 
fact that the mission itself was not military in nature. 
There also was a philosophical gap between political and military goals: unify vs. 
separate. Moreover the military saw the lines of separation from a different perspective 
than political leaders. As General Clark recounts the negotiations:  
We would want to divide the ground along defensible lines, avoiding the 
kinds of isolated pockets and peninsular-type arrangements that could 
encourage renewed conflict later or that would simply prove 
unenforceable in practice. If we stuck by the Contact Group proposal, we 
would face some difficult problems due to the way the group’s proposed 
division of territory split lines of communication and ignored the key 
terrain features that were the more natural borders.155 
Many of the participants and observers agreed that the main military objectives 
defined for IFOR had been quickly accomplished. Mr. Nicholas Soames, on behalf of the 
British Secretary of State for Defense, answering a question related to IFOR Operation 
Joint Endeavour on October 28 1996, noted that “the operation has been conspicuously 
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successful and all the key military objectives have been achieved.”156 In its annual report, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross also pointed out that: 
The main military objectives [of IFOR] – cessation of hostilities and 
separation of ground forces – had been reached early on in the process, 
making a significant contribution to stability and security in the region.157 
Implementation of the political and humanitarian aspects of Dayton, however, has 
not been completed until today. Even though the military is not really responsible for the 
implementation of those goals, its mission end state cannot be separated from them 
because it cannot leave the theater until the political objectives are accomplished. The 
question is evident: if the military is not subordinated to the High Representative, the 
appointed political authority responsible for coordination of peace implementation effort, 
how is it supposed to support political objectives? 
This leads to the third gap between political and military objectives, which is a 
lack of coordination in the command structure between the political authorities of the UN 
and NATO.  
The High Representative was not a UN Special Representative with UN 
authority and his political guidance came from a Steering Board of the 
Peace Implementation Council, which was not a standing internationally 
recognized political organization. Given the UN’s reluctance to play a lead 
role, there was no internationally recognized political organization 
providing overall political direction.158  
IFOR operated under NATO political and military command, “with a grant of 
authority from the UN,” according to the text of the GFA. The logic of Karl von 
Clausewitz’s argument that the military is a mean for reaching political goals through war 
may be applied to Bosnia as well. An international military peace force is created to 
support the political goals of the international community. In practical terms, the military 
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is best able to support policies if there is a clear command and control structure 
connecting the political authorities with the military command. Given that in Bosnia the 
desired end state required both military and civilian involvement, either the UN or NATO 
ideally should have held the political authority for the coordination of those activities. 
Within the IFOR Command and Control organization on the one hand, the 
military had no links at all to the UN and played a narrow role that focused on the 
mandated military tasks. Although this meant separation from broader political goals, 
thanks to clear mission requirements military success was more easily achieved.159 On 
the other hand, civilian implementation was not subordinated to NATO political 
authorities, which also contributed to the difficult coordination and synchronization of 
civilian and military tasks. 
Despite the clear political aim to prosecute suspected war criminals, IFOR did not 
initiate arrest operations. One of the reasons for avoiding this type of involvement was 
the recent experience in Somalia, where an arrest attempt led to disaster and spoiled the 
whole mission. The other reason was that specific military objectives did not list the task 
of supporting the political goal of arrests. The unwillingness of former belligerents to 
hand over indicted war criminals to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia frustrated the international community, and finally in July 1997 Stabilization 
Force (SFOR) accomplished the first arrest operation.160 
The unintentional separation of political and military objectives is well illustrated 
in US President Bill Clinton’s announcement of a timeframe for Bosnian operations in 
November 1995. Based on an assessment by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he envisioned the 
time needed to implement IFOR objectives would be one year. As retired U.S. Army 
General William Odom commented, “the very idea of creating a stable Bosnia in one 
year is ludicrous.”161 Clinton’s optimism can be partly explained by the usual reluctance 
of political and military leaders to become too deeply engaged in post-conflict state 
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building. The difficulties of translating policies into sound military objectives and limited 
military achievements in political terms result in disconnections that are hard to breach in 
the complex environment of peace operations. 
2. The Case of Kosovo 
In the spring of 1999, Serbian forces entered the Yugoslav province of Kosovo 
and began a systematic campaign of what became known as “ethnic cleansing,” in which 
hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo were terrorized and expelled 
from their homes. Once the Albanians had been removed, ethnic Serbs settled into their 
former lands and homes. Albanian fighters organized resistance and the region became 
embroiled in bloody irregular conflict.  After diplomatic measures had failed Europe and 
NATO responded by starting an air campaign to prevent further ethnic atrocities and 
enforce peace settlement.  
NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana defined five political objectives for the 
Kosovo military operations in the first days of NATO’s bombing campaign.  
The first is a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate 
ending of violence and repression. The second is the withdrawal from 
Kosovo of the Yugoslav army, the military, the police, and the para-
military forces. Third, the stationing in Kosovo of an international military 
presence. The fourth is the unconditional and safe return of all refugees 
and all the displaced persons. The fifth, the credible assurance of 
(Yugoslav President Slobodan) Milosevic’s willingness to work on the 
basis of the Rambouillet accord towards a political solution for Kosovo in 
conformity with international law and the charter of the United Nations.162 
NATO’s military commander, General Wesley Clark said on March 25:  
We aim to put his (President Milosevic’s) military and security forces at 
risk. We are going to systematically and progressively attack, disrupt, 
degrade, devastate, and ultimately - unless President Milosevic complies 
with the demands of the international community - we are going to destroy 
these forces and their facilities and support. In that respect, the operation 
will be just as long and difficult as President Milosevic requires it to be.163 
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The military objectives of Operation Allied Force were directed to ensure full 
compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1199 and 1203. The concept for the 
operation envisaged a five-phased air campaign, if necessary, to achieve political 
objectives with minimum force: 
• Phase 0 was the deployment of air assets into the European Theater.  
• Phase 1 would establish air superiority over Kosovo (creating a no-fly 
zone south of 44 degrees north latitude) and degrade command and 
control and the integrated air-defense system over the whole of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  
• Phase 2 would attack military targets in Kosovo and those Yugoslav 
forces south of 44 degrees north latitude, which were providing 
reinforcement to Serbian forces in Kosovo. This was to allow targeting 
of forces not only in Kosovo, but also in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia south of Belgrade.  
• Phase 3 would expand air operations against a wide range of high-
value military and security force targets throughout the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.  
• Phase 4 would redeploy forces as required.164 
The gap in time periods, just as in the IFOR case, can be clearly observed 
although in reverse. This time the first political objective (stop military activity and 
violence) required an immediate solution through decisive military operations. However, 
the air campaign plan and military preparation, both in the minds of decision-makers and 
in practice, were set to support diplomacy only lightly and lacked either the decisive 
force or intention of solving the conflict by military means. 
Phase one of the NATO campaign was intended to set the safe conditions for 
further air operations rather than stop violence. The openly communicated exclusion of 
ground troops and limited nature of the campaign did not “demonstrate the seriousness” 
of NATO. NATO started the operation with 350 planes within range of Bosnia. It was 
one-third of the number that would be used later to bring an end to the conflict, and only 
one-fifth the number the United States would have used in a major regional conflict.165 
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As General Clark recalls in his book related to the so-called Cold War strategy of 
’flexible response,’ NATO’s well-established and practiced command and control 
procedures intended not to “seek victory” but, based on the rational behavior of the 
opponent, to deter or enforce “conflict termination.”166 The military strategy in the case 
of Kosovo mirrored similar approach, however the response of Serb authorities to the air 
campaign was not really rational and definitely not what NATO hoped and planned for. 
It had been hoped, but never assumed, that President Milosevic would 
quickly realize NATO’s determination, and accept its demands. Instead, 
his campaign of ethnic cleansing escalated and, in response, NATO’s 
leadership accelerated and strengthened its air campaign considerably.167 
In fact, NATO not only failed to accomplish the first political objective in the 
beginning of operations, but also in an indirect way contributed to the escalation of the 
humanitarian crisis. In the first month of the air campaign, Serb forces expanded their 
activities against the local population, and the violence, the magnitude of death and 
forced expulsion of ethnic Albanians increased considerably. By the time NATO held its 
summit in April 1999, nearly one million ethnic Albanians had been forced out of their 
homes in Kosovo.168 
Many of NATO’s critics believe that if military commanders had had a better 
understanding of the lessons learned in Bosnia and applied the Powell doctrine (the need 
to use decisive force in military campaigns) the outcome in Kosovo could have been 
different, and the first and main political objective reached much earlier. In light of the 
political circumstances, however, it is hard to imagine the possibility of reaching 
consensus among the players on different courses of action, especially on the initial 
deployment of ground forces. And even if the use of decisive military force could be 
agreed on, the transfer and preparation of troops would need considerable time, which 
again would have allowed the Serbs to force ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo. Taking 
everything into account, the air campaign, especially after a serious intensification, 
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deserves credit for winning the war, but other factors, like the subsequent threat of 
ground operations, played important roles as well. 
Lord Owen commented on demonstrations of force and necessary military build-
ups:  
Had such a build-up been started before and during the Rambouillet 
negotiations, then President Milosevic would have negotiated more 
seriously and very likely neither NATO bombs nor missiles would have 
been used.169 
The philosophical gap between political and military objectives this time was 
somewhat narrowed but still existed. Political objectives were direct and clear. By 
contrast, military strategy was indirect and uncertain both in scale and result. The set of 
targets and the phases of the campaign did not support directly either of the stated 
political goals. NATO officials and White House spokesmen were about the only ones 
who seemed to believe that air power alone could achieve the desired objectives.170 
According to Admiral James Ellis, then Commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe 
and Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, “NATO lacked not only a 
coherent campaign plan and target set but also the staff to generate a detailed plan when it 
was clear that one was needed.”171 
While Milosevic was prepared for war, the NATO military machine was not 
intended to reach war capacity at all. As General Clark stated, it was undoubted before 
the beginning of operations that NATO could not actually do much to save civilians in 
Kosovo.  
Despite our best efforts the civilians are going to be targeted by the Serbs. 
It will just be a race, our air strikes and the damage we cause them against 
what they can do on the ground. But in the short term, they can win the 
race.172 
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The target selection of Operation Allied Force included strategic and tactical 
military objectives, with the emphasis on tactical targets.  
Strategic targets included the Serb air defenses, command and control 
facilities, the Yugoslav military (VJ) and police (MUP) forces 
headquarters in Belgrade, and supply routes. Tactical targets comprised 
military facilities, fielded forces, heavy weapons, and military vehicles 
and formations in Kosovo.173 
After a month of bombing with limited success, alliance leaders decided to further 
intensify the campaign by deploying additional aircraft, developing new target-sets like 
military-industrial infrastructure, propaganda-related media, and other strategic 
objects.174 Overall, 29 per cent of all Yugoslav/Serbian ammunition storage capacity, 57 
per cent of petroleum reserve capacity, and all Yugoslav oil refineries were destroyed.175 
The effect of tactical bombing is hard to measure. An assessment team 
enumerated the confirmed number of strikes that were determined to have achieved 
successful hits against mobile targets in Kosovo and Presevo Valley areas over the 
duration of the operation: Artillery/Mortars: 389; APCs: 153; Military Vehicles: 339 and 
Tanks: 93 pieces.176 These sound like a considerable number compared to NATO 
intelligence estimate of the strength of Yugoslav forces in Kosovo at the beginning of the 
conflict, which assumed 300 tanks and 150 artillery pieces.177 Weather conditions and 
risk avoidance, however, altered operations in the first few weeks, while the number of 
aircraft and sorties only began to increase in mid-April, so the biggest chunk of hits 
probably date from after the first month. While the military campaign needed time to 
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achieve results, regular and irregular Serb forces were able to act with impunity against 
the Albanian population for most of the war.178 
This time, the gap in command and control was between NATO members 
themselves. The air campaign was conducted through both NATO and U.S. command 
channels. The overall commander was General Clark, serving as both Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command 
(USEUCOM). The NATO operational commander was Admiral (USN) James O. Ellis, 
serving as Commander, Allied Forces Southern Europe and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. 
Naval Forces Europe. 
An array of authorities, including those at the highest national political 
levels, permanent representatives on the North Atlantic Council, Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe, air planners in Allied Forces Southern Europe, 
and authorities in countries hosting NATO aircraft were involved in the 
target-approval process. The risk of collateral damage was always an 
important consideration in deliberations over targets.... They required 
positive identification of targets before pilots were cleared to release 
ordnance. Moreover, forces were not allowed to attack military vehicles if 
they were intermingled with civilian vehicles.179 
Critiques of the campaign focused on the disconnect between political goals and 
military operations.  
Command by committee hampered NATO military leaders’ ability to 
wage an effective, rapidly responsive campaign. Target lists, weapons 
used, and forces deployed were all subject to prior approval by all NATO 
governments. This slowed decision-making, constrained operations, and 
sometimes emphasized political over military considerations.... A more 
fundamental criticism is that the air campaign’s actual objective from the 
start was political, not military — i.e., to bring President Milosevic back to 
the bargaining table. This, in turn, contributed to a constrained, 
incremental approach to targeting.180 
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Indeed, the air strikes resulted in political problems in some of the NATO 
member states. In Germany tensions within the ruling coalition increased to the point that 
the government was in danger of collapse. A similar situation arose in Italy when former 
Communists considered withdrawing from the ruling coalition. Greek opposition parties 
and the general population expressed sympathy with the Serbian position and called for a 
diplomatic solution. The three new NATO members, Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland did not contribute aircraft to the operation, and Hungary expressed concerns about 
the position of the Hungarian minority in northern Serbia.181 
Once offensive operations were underway, NATO leaders had to put considerable 
effort into maintaining alliance cohesion, which in itself became a primary strategic 
objective in the offensive phase of the conflict.182 Once again it becomes clear that the 
forging of a common political will within an alliance is never an easy matter. 
Furthermore, the success of military operations not only supports, but also strongly 
depends, on political leadership. 
B.  CONCLUSIONS 
A well-orchestrated combination of statecraft and force is the essential condition 
of success in peace operations. As Donald Abenheim notes, “the issue here (crisis 
management in Kosovo) is less the strategic limitations of democratic government than 
the nervous floundering of civil and military elites as they face strategic realities in all 
their political complexity and disorder, weighted down by an array of historical 
analogues and ideological assumptions.”183 In those circumstances, the deliberation of 
policies tests all aspects of decision-making. Once a policy is agreed upon, however, it 
should be possible to translate it into a comprehensive military strategy if both political 
and military objectives are phased and synchronized in time. Short-term and long-term 
objectives should be defined clearly and comprehensively.  
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In the cases of both IFOR and Operation Allied Force, political and military 
objective were not synchronized in time and objectives were not phased. Although the air 
campaign in Kosovo had three operational phases, it was not connected directly to policy 
objectives but rather expressed the levels of planned campaign intensity, which 
corresponded to intensified Serb activities in the ground. All the factors at play in Kosovo 
made the integration of policies into military objectives almost impossible. As General 
Clark observed: 
We had to take sides, and sometimes to use force in limited ways, to gain 
the political ends sought. On the ground, we found ourselves struggling to 
assess the appropriate degree of risk. It was difficult to integrate political 
and strategic issues into the tactical considerations.184 
In both the Bosnia and Kosovo campaigns, besides the operational disconnect 
there was a philosophic gap between policies and military strategies. Leaders typically 
declare political as well as military objectives but they rarely explain how the latter are 
intended to support the former. Most of the time, both political and military leaders seem 
to be more comfortable leaving some ambiguity in the relationship between those goals. 
Policies cannot be always clear and comprehensive enough to translate them into well-
defined military goals, and agreement among members of the coalition or international 
community can be hard to reach in the broader context of different national and domestic 
political interests. Even if policies are clear enough, they consider a range of options and 
actors, and it is hard to find an exact method for the use of force to support desired 
political objectives. 
This ambiguity in the relationship between policies and operations can be 
decreased by not only making the mandate for the military clear, but defining political 
objectives as well; military and political leaders must then consider, plan and explain how 
operations will support those political objectives. 
The unity of the political and command structures was tenuous in both Bosnia and 
Kosovo. It was worse in IFOR, but it caused delay and inefficiency in Kosovo air 
operations as well. Although those issues are probably inherent in democratic political 
decision-making and coalition warfare, a single, internationally recognized political 
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authority, and a clear command and control structure are necessary for effective and 
successful operations. Institutional arrangements should play a useful role in lessening 
the confusion and ambiguity of political and military decision-making. Institutions 
therefore should facilitate effective working procedures and develop a professional 
culture sophisticated enough to carry out needed problem solving, analysis and 
command-control. 
Coalition members or actors within the international community often harbor 
significant political objectives and behind-the scene-motives besides those declared for 
the particular mission. These can include avoiding friendly losses, minimizing collateral 
damage, following political agendas and striving for public support. All of those 
incidental goals can significantly constrain the options and conduct of military 
operations. In Bosnia and Kosovo those agendas were actually in opposition to declared 
political objectives, and their priority decreased the speed and effectiveness with which 
the military could accomplish its objectives. As a French official noted: “Dans la guerre, 
il faut des morts,” or, “In war, there must be deaths.”185 The question remains whether 
coalition members and their constituents are willing to pay that price in future peace 
operations. 
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V.  COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGES AND THE EFFECT OF SEPTEMBER 11 
Recognizing its weaknesses in formulating common foreign policy, and then 
backing that diplomacy with military force in the Balkan conflicts, the European Union 
was forced to change CFSP procedures, its institutional setup and its relationship with 
NATO. The catastrophic events in the United States on September 11, 2001 initially 
brought EU members to consensus on common policies against terrorism. EU leaders 
acknowledged that the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the European 
Security and Defense Policy, should play an important role in countering the global 
terrorist threat and in promoting peace and stability.186 This consensus nevertheless 
seemed to be strongly held only with regard to the strengthening of internal security for 
the Union.  
The opinions of EU members and such candidates as the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland are showing signs of a widening split when it comes to formulating 
foreign policy related to methods of fighting terrorism. Furthermore, the planned military 
tool of the CFSP, the Rapid Reaction Force, originally was linked to peace operations, 
and it is not clear yet if the task of fighting terrorism will be added to the basic mission of 
the RRF. It also is not yet apparent whether the challenge of resisting international 
terrorism will distract the focus of the EU from developing capabilities to manage peace 
operations, or will lead to the integration of different missions to reinforce the ability of 
the CFSP to handle both security issues with one mechanism. 
The chapter is divided into two main sections. Section A reviews institutional 
developments within the EU’s CFSP structure and its relationship with NATO. Section B 
describes the initial EU response to September 11, and the case of the nine European 
countries (members and candidates) that disrupted the EU’s common foreign and security 
policy by expressing support of US policy towards Iraq on January 30, 2003. 
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A.  DEVELOPMENT OF EU-NATO RELATIONSHIP AND CFSP 
INSTITUTIONS  
The institutional set up of the European Union and the EU’s relationship with 
NATO decision-making bodies in the planning and execution of crisis management 
activities could determine the success or failure of future peacekeeping missions. These 
factors affect the formulation of common foreign and security policies and the use of 
force in crisis management operations, as they are defined in the "Petersberg tasks" 
approved by the Western European Union in 1992, and subsequently incorporated by the 
European Union into the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty.187 Both institutions and relationships 
underwent significant changes at the turn of the millennium. Within the EU, a number of 
new arrangements were introduced in the past few years.188 These arrangements are 
supposed to contribute to the effective management of the Petersberg tasks within the 
CFSP framework, and also enhance cooperation with NATO through institutional 
similarities and procedural adaptation. 
The existing relationship between NATO and the EU in planning for 
peacekeeping missions is partly formal and partly informal. Both types of interaction play 
an important role in the decision-making process. This section of the thesis focuses on the 
foundation of this relationship from the EU’s perspective.  
1. The Formal EU-NATO Relationship 
The formal aspect of the relationship between the EU and NATO is based on 
institutional settings, decision-making processes, dialogue, consultation and the 
establishment of Ad Hoc Working Groups (which began meeting in Summer 2000) to 
strengthen cooperation.  
a. Institutional Development in the EU 
The EU seemingly is committed to the speedy development of its 
institutions to support CFSP requirements and “Headline Goals.” There are two basic 
concerns in the development process: 1) the willingness of member states to contribute 
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more resources toward decreasing the gap between desires and capabilities; and 2) 
effectiveness of decision-making procedures. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William 
S. Cohen expressed his concern in early 2000, that  
My fear is that we will see European nations constructing a new 
bureaucracy that will be needed to implement some of these reforms in 
procurement opportunities. In looking at the budgets that I see from our 
side of the Atlantic, I see countries consistently cutting their budgets at the 
very same time that there is a recognition that you have to improve your 
capabilities… you cannot continue to cut budgets and hope to achieve the 
reforms and the procurement requirements for ESDI and for NATO, and 
my fear is that we will see a bureaucratic system set up. We will see 
declining budgets and we will not see the capability to match the words 
that we have talked about so passionately in Washington and now here 
today as well.189  
The processes in the EU seem to prove the truth of his remarks. 
The CFSP is part of the existing European Community single institutional 
framework. The balance of power related to CFSP implementation is not equally divided 
between the three main pillars (Council, Parliament and Commission), as in other policy 
areas (e.g., economics, trade agriculture). For example, the Commission is fully 
associated with the CFSP, but the initiatives come mainly from the presidency, a member 
state or the High Representative. The president consults and briefs the European 
Parliament on the fundamental choices and development issues related to CFSP.190 
The European Council, as the highest authority in the Community 
structure, and the General Affairs Council (as one formation of the Council of the 
European Union) were established in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) 
(consolidated version). Article 18 of the Treaty defines the role and responsibilities of the 
Presidency in the CFSP. He represents the Union’s foreign and security policy, and is 
responsible for the implementation of CFSP decisions.  
The European Commission was empowered in Article 211 of the 
European Treaty. There are four Commissioners, known as the “Committee of Four,” 
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who are responsible for different areas of external relations. The Commissioner for 
External Relations plays an important role in the implementation of CFSP concepts. The 
Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 strengthened the ability of the European Union to instruct the 
Western European Union191 to carry out peacekeeping missions. It also established the 
office of High Representative (HR, simultaneously the Secretary-General of the 
Council of Ministers) that is virtually the post of “the EU’s minister for foreign affairs 
and defense.”192 The Amsterdam Treaty also brought into existence the Policy Planning 
and Early Warning Unit within the Council Secretariat; the Situation Center as part of 
a joint civilian-military Crisis Management Center; and the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives. 
Other key institutions for ESDP were defined in the Helsinki European 
Council in December 1999. Those are the standing Political and Security Committee 
(PSC) in Brussels; the Military Committee (MC); and the Military Staff (MS) within 
the Council structures.193 In May 2000, the European Council decided formally to 
establish the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). 
b. Hierarchical Responsibilities of Institutions 
The hierarchical structures of key council institutions for CFSP are 
represented in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. 
The European Council is the highest authority. It consists of the heads of 
state or government of the 15 member countries and the president of the European 
Commission. The EU Council normally meets twice a year to define the EU’s principles, 
strategic guidelines and objectives for CFSP. 
The General Affairs Council (GAC) is the most important body in the 
Council of the European Union. It includes foreign ministers from each state and deals 
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with the formulation and implementation of CFSP. The council meets at least once a 
month to ensure the Union’s actions will be unified, consistent and effective.  
The Presidency rotates every six months among the member states. The 
president presides over every council or sub-council meeting, is responsible for ensuring 
the implementation of agreed measures, and represents the EU in all matters of external 
policy. Because of the short presidential term, a committee called the ‘troika,’ consisting 
of the current president, the next president and the HR for CFSP, is intended to provide 
some degree of continuity to the position. 
The Commissioner for External Relations is responsible for the 
commission’s role in CFSP, interfaces with the GAC and with the HR for CFSP, and 
attends European Council meetings. The commissioner has the potential to contribute 
significantly to conflict management through the considerable staff and budget at his 
disposal.194 
The High Representative (HR) for CFSP is appointed by unanimous 
decision of the European Council. The HR formulates, prepares and manages the foreign 
and security policy of the European Union, and upon request conducts political dialogue 
with third countries.  
The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) is made up 
of the ambassadors or permanent representatives of member states. It prepares the 
dossiers for all council meetings. COREPER meets at least once every week, and it is “in 
the best position to ensure consistency and coherency between many policy areas.”195 
The Political and Security Committee196 (PSC) is a permanent 
organization, made up of officials of ambassadorial rank from each member state. PSC 
guarantees the link between CFSP and ESDP by contributing to the council’s policy 
formulation and overseeing policy implementation. PSC also monitors the international 
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situation, playing a central role in defining the Union’s response to crises. In its role as 
primary crisis manager, the PSC sends guidelines to and receives advice from the 
Military Committee and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. The 
PSC is “the single most important group in the management of CFSP and ESDP after the 
General Affairs Council itself.”197 
The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) 
is developing plans and an inventory of resources for non-military crisis response and 
conflict prevention, to enhance the EU’s capability in the areas of policing, strengthening 
rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection.  
The Military Committee198 (MC), generally a body of military 
representatives of member states’ chiefs of defense, meets at the level of chiefs of 
defense in special circumstances. It gives military advice to the Political and Security 
Committee on the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Operation Plans (OPLAN), and 
directs the work of the military staff. The MC is also “the forum for military consultation 
and cooperation between member states in the field of conflict prevention and crises 
management.”199 
The Military Staff200 (MS) assists the council in the exercise of political 
control and strategic direction for Petersberg-type operations. It does not deal with 
operational planning, but develops strategic military options for contingency scenarios. 
The MS recently comprised about 40 members and is planned to grow to 134 staffers by 
2003. 
The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit is responsible for 
“monitoring, analysis and assessment of international developments and events, including 
                                                 
197 “EU Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention and 
Management” International Crises Group, Issues Report N. 2. (Brussels, 2001), 29. <www.crisisweb.org> 
(15 August 2002) 
198 Council Decision of 22 January 2001 Setting up the Military Committee of the European Union 
(2001/79/CFSP), Official Journal of the European Communities, L 27/4 (30.1.2001) 
199 “EU Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention and 
Management” International Crises Group, Issues Report N. 2. (Brussels, 2001), 30. <www.crisisweb.org> 
(15 August 2002) 
200 Council Decision of 22 January 2001 on the Establishment of the Military Staff of the European 
Union (2001/80/CFSP), Official Journal of the European Communities, L 27/7 (30.1.2001) 
77 
early warning on potential crises.”201 It also prepares drafts on policy options. The staff 
consists of 24 members from the council secretariat, member states, the commission and 
a representative of the Western European Union (WEU). 
The Situation Center (within the Crisis Management Center) operates 
on a 24-hour basis in a duty-officer system. It directly supports the Political and Security 
Committee and the Military Committee with the information it collects. 
The European Parliament has only a consultative role in the CFSP, but 
its Committees on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, CSDP and Budgets gained influence 
by requiring frequent reports and holding joint hearings.  
At the Laeken Council in December 2001, EU leaders declared that the key 
institutions and decision-making processes for conflict management were operational, 
although Turkey and Greece blocked the agreement by which the EU would have access 
to NATO planning assets. As the use of those assets is fundamental for the EU’s crisis 
response capability, in practical terms the lack of them deprives the EU of the strategic 
resources it needs for complex operations.202 Fortunately, a situation hasn’t arisen to put 
the EU’s crisis management capabilities to the test.  
c. NATO-EU Dialogues and Ad Hoc Working Groups 
The Washington Summit in 1999 defined the guiding principles and 
directions for NATO-EU dialogues. The allies had committed themselves to the 
development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency-building 
measures on the basis of existing mechanisms between NATO and the WEU. 
Nevertheless, there remain serious concerns on the part of non-EU members and non-
European allies about issues of weakening alliance cohesion, limited participation in EU 
decision-making and unbalanced burden sharing. 
                                                 
201 “EU Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention and 
Management” International Crises Group, Issues Report N. 2. (Brussels, 2001), 27. <www.crisisweb.org> 
(15 August 2002) 
202 “EU Crisis Response Capabilities: An Update” International Crises Group, Issues Briefing 
(Brussels, 2002), 8. <www.crisisweb.org> (20 October 2002) 
78 
The starting point for the NATO-EU relationship, particularly with regard 
to EU access to NATO collective assets, was set out in the Washington Summit 
Communiqué (1999): 
a) Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities, to facilitate military 
planning for EU-led operations; 
b) Guarantees to the EU that specified NATO capabilities and common 
assets will be available for use in EU-led operations;  
c) Enhancement of European command options for EU-led operations, 
including the roles and responsibilities of the Deputy Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe ;  
d) The adaptation of NATO's defense planning system to better 
incorporate forces for EU-led operations.203  
EU-NATO cooperation on sharing assets and command and control 
structures has not yet been finalized. This will be one of the most important tasks of the 
EU-NATO dialogue on European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Chris Patten, the 
EU’s External Relations Commissioner, defined the official policy in a speech he gave in 
2000: 
We do not seek to duplicate NATO’s role…. We want to strengthen our 
contribution to NATO and to European security. As George Robertson put 
it…ESD[P] is not about Europe going it alone, but about Europe doing 
more.204 
In order to develop NATO-EU relationships, NATO members agreed in July 2000 to set 
up bilateral ad hoc working groups to focus on four specific areas: security arrangements; 
developing permanent arrangements for consultation and cooperation; defining 
modalities for EU access to NATO assets; and formulating EU capability goals.205 
In regard to the security group, interim security arrangements between 
NATO and the EU Council Secretariat entered into force at the end of July 2000. This 
facilitated the exchange of classified information between the two organizations, and 
created the basis for future, permanent arrangements. Some observers, however, 
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expressed concern that if the EU introduces a top-secret classification system, the “EU 
could end up constructing a common security and defense body that is oddly reminiscent 
of NATO.”206  The second working group is examining the principles upon which future 
EU-NATO consultation should be built, and the actual mechanism that could be applied 
in peacetime and during crises. Work in the third group focuses on practical arrangements 
to allow EU access to NATO assets and capabilities, and in particular the issues 
highlighted in the first three paragraphs of the Washington Summit Communiqué (see 
above). 
Working group four is concentrating on capability goals and how NATO’s 
defense planning system could best be adapted to incorporate more fully available forces 
for EU-led operations.  
The work of these ad hoc groups is an important step in strengthening 
NATO-EU relations. It contributes to the clarification of command and control 
arrangements by laying down the main principles and procedures. It also facilitates 
burden and asset sharing by working out the main guidelines for future cooperation and 
division of responsibilities.  
The Presidency Report to the Göteborg European Council on ESDP207 
concluded that consultation and cooperation between the EU and NATO on crises 
management in the Western Balkans has been a success, emphasizing some particular 
developments such as the first formal EU-NATO ministerial meeting at Budapest on May 
30, 2001.208 In addition to several meetings of the EU PSC and NATO NAC, a meeting 
has also been held at the level of the military committees. The joint activities of the 
Secretary-General/High Representative and the NATO Secretary-General, as well as of 
their representatives in the Balkan region also have been notable. 
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Many of these basic questions on cooperation will still require a positive 
attitude and a wide-ranging consultation effort. Secretary General Lord Robertson 
frequently has emphasized the principle that more Europe will not mean less NATO, and 
a stronger Europe will result in a stronger Atlantic alliance.209  
2. Informal Relationships 
The informal relationships between the organizations are at least as important as 
the formal ones, given that many EU countries share membership in NATO. The two 
entities have a number of personnel who work in both bureaucracies; these leaders and 
bureaucrats are able to use their common experiences and relationships to the advantage 
of both organizations. And finally, the official principle of the Treaty of European Union 
-- that member states are to support the CFSP in their foreign policies -- probably plays a 
determining role in the decision-making process at NATO. 
Among the fifteen EU member states only four are not members of NATO: 
Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden.210 Eight of the nineteen NATO members do not 
have membership in the EU: Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, 
Poland, Turkey and the United States.211 Those eleven members of both the EU and 
NATO have an important role to play in the flow of information between the two 
organizations.  
NATO’s primary policy-making body is the North Atlantic Council, comprising 
permanent representatives of all member countries, who meet at least once a week. “The 
Council also meets at higher levels, involving Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers or 
Heads of Government....”212 These same leaders formulate EU policy in the European 
Council and in the Union’s General Affairs Council. 
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NATO’s Defense Planning Committee deals with defense matters and collective 
defense planning. It is made up of permanent representatives, but also meets at the 
ministerial at least twice a year.213 EU defense ministers, who participate in the work of 
the Council of Ministers on defense related issues, meet with the Chiefs of Defense in the 
EU’s Military Committee under special circumstances. 
Javier Solana Madariaga is the EU’s High Representative for CFSP and 
Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers. The fact that he is also the Secretary-
General of the WEU and former Secretary-General of NATO has far-reaching 
implications for the relationship between NATO and EU institutions.214 Solana’s 
experience, knowledge and personal contacts can help facilitate EU-NATO dialogue and 
improve cooperation, while his earlier experience in NATO has enabled him to put in 
place sophisticated CFSP decision–making structures and procedures.  
The principal NATO forums (see Table 3) for consultation on crisis management 
are the Council and the Defense Planning Committee, supported by the Policy 
Coordination Group, the Political Committee, the Military Committee and the Senior 
Civil Emergency Planning Committee.215 As mentioned previously, the EU adapted a 
very similar decision-making structure for CFSP issues.  Also important for coordination 
and cooperation between these two entities is the fact that they are both located in the city 
of Brussels. The extensive changes and enlargement that EU institutions are undergoing, 
as in the military staff already mentioned, require new personnel with expertise in crisis 
management. Those staffers mainly come with NATO operational experience, are 
familiar with NATO procedures and have broad personal contacts with former colleagues 
in the alliance bureaucracy.  
The EU is quickly developing its institutions and decision-making procedures to 
suit the requirements of the CFSP. Within NATO, work on the principal issues relating to 
the further development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) is going 
forward as well. The formulation of EU’s military forces, however, still is at an early 
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stage. Key issues, like command and control arrangements, integration into other security 
systems, intelligence sharing and planning, and troop and assets allocation need to be 
finalized. At this stage, the RRF probably is not yet in a condition to give effective 
support to the EU CFSP, especially in conflicts where “important parties are inclined to 
recognize only one persuasive norm: that might is right.”216 
B.  EUROPEAN UNION RESPONSES TO SEPTEMBER 11217 
The European Union as an entity quickly recognized the impact of September 11, 
2001 on the future security environment, and initiated a number of common policies, 
joint actions and practical arrangements to meet the new challenges. EU members 
initiated radical changes and steps for cooperation against the common terrorist threat at 
both the regional and international levels, with an emphasis on the former.  
This section is organized into four parts. The first outlines the trend of major EU 
policies in response to the terrorist threat. The second discusses practical arrangements 
within the EU Action Plan to prevent and fight terrorism. The third section describes 
institutional changes and their results within the European Police (Europol), while the last 
part draws some conclusions based on these discussions.  
1. EU Policies After September 11 
The events of September 11 were a turning point for the European Union (EU), as 
they were for much of the world. The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington 
made clear that security and democracy must actively and ceaselessly be promoted. EU 
members had defined the strengthening of cooperation in the fight against international 
terrorism as one of the main objectives of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) as far back as 1992.218 At that time, however, Europeans tended to treat the 
familiar forms of terrorism -- by actors such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the 
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Basque ‘Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna’ (ETA), and the National Organization of Cypriot 
Fighters (EOKA) -- that targeted government legitimacy or state capacity, for the most 
part internal matters. By contrast, the events of September 11 made clear that 
international terrorism had become a challenge for the international order and an attack 
on the very existence of liberal democracy. Therefore, EU states immediately reaffirmed 
that such threats "must be met through steadfast international cooperation.”219 
The big question is whether conventional policies against domestic terrorism -- 
i.e., cease-fire and negotiations; economic development; political reform; collective 
punishment; emergency powers; employment of security forces -- are sufficient or 
appropriate to combat international terrorism.220 There are several important differences 
between domestic and international terrorist objectives and activities. First, although 
international terrorism challenges the international order, terrorist groups may not pose a 
direct threat to the country (or countries) from which they operate. Second, many 
international terrorist networks do not belong to a recognizable nation-state, and therefore 
are known as “non-state actors.” Next, as these networks organize and spread around the 
globe, having access to sophisticated computer technology, Internet and communication 
systems, their detection and disruption requires efficient cooperation among all states. 
Finally, even if governments are ready to cooperate, weak states' poor capacity to control 
their own domestic situation often allows terrorists to maneuver freely. This is especially 
true for Third World countries, but there also are many examples of developed countries 
(Great Britain for example) that have not been able to shut down domestic terrorist 
organizations. To facilitate international cooperation, the EU eagerly joined the US-led 
anti-terrorist coalition, and reconfigured its common policy toward the international 
terrorist threat. 
The EU generally reacted to the events of 9/11 with speed and determination, both 
at home and in the international arena. Previously developed security initiatives, 
institutions and procedures such as the ESDI and Common Foreign and Security Policy 
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(CFSP) contributed to this prompt response. ESDI represents members’ intention to 
organize a common European military capability within NATO, able to respond to 
common threats and instability in Europe. The CFSP represents a political-military 
mechanism to confront international challenges. Therefore, just ten days after the attack 
on the World Trade Center, a special European Council meeting in Brussels adopted a 
plan of action that included several policy declarations: solidarity and cooperation with 
the United States, a European policy to combat terrorism, and reaffirmation of the 
Union's commitment to world economic prosperity.221 The resulting Action Plan 
provided the needed political basis for taking common urgent measures to respond to 
international terrorism. 
As a result of this common EU policy, its members adopted a set of precise 
measures to identify, disrupt and neutralize potential terrorist organizations. Furthermore, 
the EU stressed the need to apply a set of political, cultural, and economical sanctions 
and measures against certain persons, entities and states that provide support to terrorist 
organizations. For example, the EU embargoed arms, military equipment and supplies, 
froze funds suspected of belonging to terrorists, and prohibited technical advice or 
training in Afghanistan.222 
According to EU policy, the armed forces are a last resort to combat international 
terrorists. Military actions, including all anti-terrorist measures, should be conducted in 
accordance with international norms upholding fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Although EU policy never has entertained any intent to negotiate with international 
terrorist organizations, however, the EU has tended to stressed longer-term political 
solutions in line with Hewitt’s ‘root cause’ argument, to eradicate the breeding ground for 
potential terrorism in a multi-faceted war on terror, as opposed to quick military actions 
against its symptoms.223 
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Three important observations come from an examination of EU policies and 
common actions. First, despite its intense multilateralism, the EU decision-making 
system is not strongly federalized throughout every pillar and stratum of governance. The 
views and will of member states depend on their individual governments, constitutions, 
sets of laws, financial and economic systems and other factors. Those views, which differ 
in small and large countries and from South to North can slow down and even paralyze 
decision-making. What is more, EU institutions have jurisdiction only over limited policy 
areas, while everything else remains the responsibility of each member state.   
Second, although the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force is expected to be operational by 
2003, until it is, the EU does not have sufficient military forces to operate on its own.224 
The EU therefore is forced to rely heavily on NATO assets and the Western European 
Union’s security arrangements. As a consequence, the EU does not plan or perform 
military activities in the fight on terrorism, and its “confirmed staunchest support for 
military operations” in Afghanistan remained mostly rhetoric, dependent on member 
states’ individual decisions and contributions. 225 
Finally, the EU seemingly applies different midterm and long-term strategies than 
does Washington. Instead of concentrating on direct (i.e., military) measures against 
countries that provide a home for terrorists, the EU mainly focuses on core causes, and 
targets the elimination of the economic and political grounds for this terrible 
phenomenon. Of course, this approach also is more suitable to the EU’s political reality 
and military capabilities. 
2. European Union’s Action Plan 
Immediately after the events of 9/11, EU leaders condemned the terrorist acts226 
and called on EU members and partners to cooperate against this threat.227 Ten days later 
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the so-called Extraordinary European Council Meeting developed a Plan of Actions 
(henceforward referred to as the Plan).228 The European Parliament ratified the document 
on October 4, 2001 with some amendments.229 The driving forces behind development of 
the Plan were the principles that the terrorist attacks on the United States were an attack 
on all democratic states; that terrorist groups cannot be equated to the Arab and Muslim 
world; and that the EU will act in concert against terrorism under all circumstances. 
The Plan defined EU actions in several areas, the description of which goes far 
beyond the limits of this paper. On the other hand, their implementation is a continuous 
process that has been revised and amended time and again, with the result heavily 
dependent on the contributions of member states, candidates and other voluntary aligned 
countries. For those reasons this section focuses on the Plan itself, which best reflects the 
views and will of the EU as a community institution. The Plan consists of four parts. 
a. Solidarity and Cooperation with the United States   
In this part, the EU reiterated its support for US efforts to bring the 
perpetrators to justice on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1368. To combat 
international terrorism, the EU Action Plan reaffirmed the Union’s commitment to 
international norms and the Security Council’s authority. The EU called for a broader 
coalition under the UN aegis. Besides the United States and EU, the plan emphasized 
inclusion of the Russian Federation, Arab and Muslim partners and any other countries 
ready to defend universal international values. 
b. The European Policy to Combat Terrorism  
This section was directed to attain a common objective. EU states agreed 
to enhance police and judicial cooperation, which presumed standardization of common 
legal procedures regarding terrorism; close cooperation of the intelligence services, 
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police, Europol and their US counterparts; and identification of terrorist organizations. It 
envisioned five main steps. 
(1) Enhancing Police and Judicial Cooperation  
• Introduction of a European arrest warrant, modernization of the system of 
extradition among the EU countries, and adoption of a definition for terrorism. 
• Identification and development of a list of presumed terrorists and terrorist 
organizations by the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHAC); improvement 
of interagency cooperation; exchange of information among national security 
forces; establishment of joint investigation teams. 
• Sharing all terrorism-related data from member states with Europol, and 
setting up a special antiterrorist team within Europol to cooperate with its US 
counterparts. 
(2) Developing International Legal Instrument  
The European Council called for all existing international 
conventions on the fight against terrorism to be implemented by all EU states as quickly 
as possible. The EU is supporting an idea to develop a general convention against 
international terrorism within the UN framework.  
(3) Putting an End to the Funding of Terrorism 
EU policy to disrupt the financial terrorist network represents one 
more tactic to strike at the foundation of international terrorism. Organizations have 
various tasks in this regard.  
• ECOFIN – the EC financial organization – and JHAC take necessary 
measures to destroy terrorists’ systems of finance; one of the first tasks was to 
develop a directive on money laundering and a decision on freezing the assets 
of suspected individuals and organizations. 
• The EC called upon member states to sign and ratify the UN Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of terrorism. 
• Measures are being drawn up to deal with non-cooperative countries identified 
by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 
(4) Strengthening Air Security  
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Additionally, the EU planned to strengthen air security by tasking 
the Transport Council to standardize air-transport security procedures. The Transport 
Council is responsible for adopting measures on the issues of weapon classification, 
technical training for crew, checking and monitoring of non-carry on luggage, protection 
of cockpit access and quality control of security measures applied by the member states. 
(5) Coordination of the European Union’s Global Action  
Finally, the European states agreed to have the General Affairs 
Council coordinate EU global actions through the CFSP mechanism. The General Affairs 
Council also has responsibility for systematic evaluation of EU relations with third 
countries that might support terrorists. 
3. The Union’s Involvement in the World 
 This section lays out the EU’s preventive policy goals for combating terrorism in 
the international arena. These policies presumes that the EU, in collaboration with the 
United States, Russia and partners in the Arab and Muslim worlds, should play an active 
role in identifying and diffusing potential regional conflicts and instabilities -- 
particularly in the Middle East -- that might provide a platform for terrorist activities. 
Such actions should be conducted through ESDI and CFSP mechanisms, according to 
UN Security Council resolutions. The EU is making several efforts to improve its ability 
to prevent and stabilize regional conflicts. Chief among them: 
• Development and implementation of Common Foreign and Security and 
European Security and Defense policies, with the accent on in-depth political 
dialogue with the countries where terrorism could originate; 
• Integration of all countries into a system of security, prosperity and improved 
development to effectively combat terrorism’s social roots; 
• Ongoing dialogue and negotiations with the international community to build 
a world of peace, rule of law and tolerance; rejection of any nationalist, racist 
or xenophobic drift, for instance toward equating terrorism with the Arabic 
and Muslim world; 
• Giving special attention to the growing problem of refugees, particularly those 
in and from Afghanistan. 
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These changes and prospective improvements in the CFSP structure and 
procedures may guarantee EU actions will be more efficient. The core problem in 
fighting terrorism, however, seemingly remains the same as in the case of Bosnia: the 
persistent difficulty of reaching consensus on common foreign and security polices. One 
of the indicators of lingering divisions in European opinion is the open letter, signed on 
January 30, 2003 by nine countries, to express support of Washington’s hard-line Iraq 
policy. The signatories were Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Hungary and later Slovakia. In their view: 
The Trans-Atlantic relationship must not become a casualty of the current 
Iraqi regime's persistent attempts to threaten world security… We must 
remain united in insisting that his regime be disarmed…230  
This directly contradicted the position of President Jacques Chirac of France and 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany. They oppose any war plans without a clear 
UN mandate, and insist on a guarantee of more time for United Nations inspectors to 
search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. An article in Time magazine summarized 
the main “European” arguments against attacking Iraq in six points:231 
• We need to see more proof that Iraq’s weapons programs still pose a threat; 
• Inspections should last long enough to achieve their purpose -- to prove that 
Iraq is or is not in compliance with UN resolutions; 
• The UN must be the only entity with the power to authorize war; 
• Invading Iraq will disrupt the war on terror (and further destabilize the 
region); 
• Cowboy Bush is back, and his style grates on potential allies;  
• America's foreign policy is too arrogant. 
                                                 
230 Alan Cowell, “European Leaders Divide Between Hawks And Doves”, New York Times January 
31, 2003  
231 Reported by J.F.O. McAllister/London, James Graff and Nicholas Le Quesne/Paris, Marguerite 
Michaels/United Nations and Massimo Calabresi/Washington “Reasons Why So Many Allies Want Bush 
To Slow Down” Time, Posted Sunday, January 26, 
<http://www.time.com/time/covers/1101030203/wallied.html> (January 30 2003) 
90 
As the New York Times reports, France, Germany and Greece, the current holder of the 
European Union's rotating presidency, had not been asked to sign the open letter. Some 
countries, like the Netherlands, refused to sign it, but several European governments and 
some top European officials, like the EU’s Secretary-General for CFSP, also were never 
consulted. Judging from these reports, EU unity on CFSP matters seems to be broken. As 
a consequence,  
Now it will be harder for Germany [current chair of the Security Council] 
and France to say that they are speaking for Europe as the showdown with 
Iraq hits its crucial phase.232 
4. World Economic Prospects  
The fourth action plan emphasizes that the European Central Bank, in close 
cooperation with the US Federal Reserve and other central banks, should assure a stable 
monetary policy to avoid "the shock affecting European economies" as a result of 
international terrorist activities.233 It also analyzes the possible economic impact of the 
events of 9/11 on the European and world markets, and outlines EU steps to soothe such 
impacts.  
5. The Case of Europol 
Research for this paper was unable to identify any newly established, central EU 
institution tasked with overall coordination of internal and external antiterrorist activities. 
Therefore, this section will focus on the tasks and activities of the anti-terrorist team 
within Europol, launched on January 1, 2002 by a decision of the Brussels European 
Council.234 The events of September 11 made it necessary to review the prioritization of 
nearly all-ongoing and planned activities of Europol, in order to direct more resources to 
the fight against international terrorism. It was made responsible for running and 
employing (mainly from a logistical and administrative point of view) a Counter 
Terrorism (CT) task force at the European level, which has been staffed with experts 
                                                 
232 Marc Champion, “Eight European Leaders Voice Their Support for U.S. On Iraq,” Wall Street 
Journal, January 30, 2003, 1 (Early Bird, January 30.) 
233 Ibid., 4. 
234 Police and Judicial Cooperation, EU Homepage: <http://europa.eu.int/news/110901/justice.htm> 
(05 December 2002) 
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from all member states and the Europol Counter Terrorism Unit.235 To carry out this 
mandate, in cooperation with the political authorities, a structure had to be built up to 
ensure the implementation of new projects as well as the continuation of existing, 
ongoing tasks and projects.  
a. Main Tasks 
This unit has been focusing on two main issues:  
• it acts as a central resource for the Member States and; 
• provides output for the Member States as requested, produced from 
assessments and intelligence (knowledge) management.  
b. Activities and Products 
Within the above mentioned tasks several activities and products have 
been developed:236  
• a maintenance of a database of CT information for the purposes of research 
and analysis; 
• administration of the EU Directory of CT competencies; 
• creation of a directory showing how CT responsibilities are divided up at the 
national level in the member states;  
• organization and dissemination (to members) of a store of CT-related 
legislation from member states,  explanatory notes about the way legislation is 
used in CT cases, and a Digest of Open Sources information about CT; 
• maintenance of an up-to-date glossary of terrorist groups; 
                                                 
235 Conclusions adopted by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs) Brussels, 21 September 2001 SN 
3926/6/01 REV 6, EU Home Page: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/terrorism/documents/concl_council_20sep_en.pdf> (09 
December 2002) 
236An Overview of the Counter Terrorism Unit Activities, Europol Homepage: 
<http://www.europol.eu.int/index.asp?page=publ_terrorism> (28 November 2002) 
92 
• production -- in co-operation with other organizations -- of reports outlining 
the terrorist situation within the European Union and analyzing possible 
trends; 
• provision of studies on CT-related matters and issue reports to member states, 
by special request or where there was a need identified by the unit; 
• continuation of existing analytical projects and initiation of new projects at the 
request of member states or when the need had been identified in other 
Europol activity related to specific terrorist phenomena. 
 
The list of EU measures and activities outlined in the plan is 
comprehensive. The short period of time between the 9/11 terrorist act and the plan’s 
preparation and approval demonstrate that the EU responded to the event quickly and 
with determination. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of implementation has yet to be 
measured, and the outcome of such an evaluation will depend on national and partner or 
associate agreements and contributions. The hardest part probably will be to maintain 
momentum and develop a strategy that can handle medium and long-term political, 
economic and military challenges. 
The unusually quick formulation of common positions and joint actions 
show that EU members recognized the serious threat of international terrorism. They also 
understood that coalition building and cooperation, as well as careful coordination of task 
implementation, are necessary to achieve better results than individual states would be 
able to do alone.237 Despite this, the three main pillars of the EU, the Council, Parliament 
and Commission, and their internal organizations run terrorist-related tasks on their own, 
without much interagency coordination. Although the CT cell in Europol is responsible 
for data collection and sharing with member states, it is not clear from available 
documents how information allocation and task assignments are arranged among the 
various kinds and levels of EU organizations. It seems the old disagreement between 
                                                 
237 Report from the Commission, EU Homepage: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/doc/com01_611.htm> (13 December 2002) 
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federalist and nationalist approaches to EU policy-making and implementation still 
undermines the possibility for good coordination and unity of effort. 
Despite all the institutional changes, the political nature of the EU means 
that reaching consensus in the area of foreign affairs is not an easy matter. No commonly 
agreed course on CFSP issues has been worked out, especially policies related to military 
interventions. Disagreement among European Union members on common foreign 
policies is likely to hurt not only the EU itself but trans-Atlantic relations as well. The 
enlargement of the EU probably will further complicate decision-making processes. 
Although the fight against terrorism is debated and planned on an international level, 
CFSP institutions do not control EU counter-terrorist activities and the plan, as a whole 
seemingly is not centralized. The establishment of a military force, the RRF -- despite 
doubts about its actual capability -- is supposed to provide a backup for the EU’s political 
and economic power. Political control over the RRF is integrated into the CFSP structure, 
but the RRF is not tasked with counter-terrorist activities. This arrangement leaves no 
room for the EU to contribute militarily to any counter-terrorist operation even if a 
common course is agreed upon. 
Generally, the EU has shown its determination to improve its political and 
military capabilities, and contribute to the support of peace and security. Based on the 
experience of the Balkans, EU efforts to improve its institutions and political procedures 
for crisis management were successful. The EU also is determined to fight against 
terrorism. It has worked out plans and keeps them updated. It runs both internal and 
external programs and activities that show its good intentions. Yet the EU keeps the two 
security issues, crisis management and terrorism, separated both in the political and 
military sense. While CFSP institutions handle crisis management, the institutions of the 
three main pillars divide the responsibility to fight terrorism, keeping the main focus on 
internal security. The CFSP military component is in an embryonic stage, and it is tasked 
only with crisis management. Force contribution to international counter-terrorist 
operations remains the business of member states, as long as plans are in harmony with 
the EU’s common policy -- and sometimes even when they are not. All these 
arrangements create confusion. The EU probably should direct more attention to 
improving its ability to coordinate community policies. It also should clarify positions, 
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tasks and responsibilities on important issues such as terrorism, integrating a common 
course into its institutional set up and procedures. Finally, the EU must find a way to 
reinforce consensus on CFSP matters, because without commonly agreed policies the 
creation of a military force will lose its meaning. 
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy has undergone some 
considerable changes since its adoption in 1992. European members have often officially 
expressed their determination to improve the CFSP. Based on their negative experiences 
in the Balkan wars of 1991-1999, EU leaders initiated changes in the Union’s institutions 
so that it might assume more responsibility for managing European security. EU 
members also decided to increase the organization’s political and economic weight in 
foreign and security policy through the establishment of a common military force.  
Although the limitations of European military forces are a widely criticized and 
important issue, this paper came to the conclusion that the inability of the EU to 
formulate common policy in a crisis probably would block deployment of a military force 
even before the question of capability came into discussion. By the same token, if the use 
of military forces ever becomes a reality, the typically complex legal, political, economic 
and military environment within the EU will severely limit the integration of common 
policies into realistic military objectives. And it is worth remembering that even 
successful military operations can’t guarantee the desired political result. 
To improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the EU’s joint policy formulation 
process, officials will have to institute changes in many areas, some of which are likely to 
be above the EU bureaucracy’s competence. 
1. The international community will have to clarify and agree to resolve the 
conflicting principles of state sovereignty and universal guarantees of human 
rights. Regional organizations (such as the EU and NATO) should be 
encouraged to play a more active role in crisis management; in principle their 
policies could result in more flexible responses to regional crises than does the 
UN system. The pervasive lack of clear definitions and criteria for legitimate 
humanitarian intervention, however, can divide the opinions of member states 
and, as a result, slow down or even block decision-making procedures. 
Besides the clarification of legitimacy, the UN should develop a clear set of 
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rights and responsibilities by which regional organizations can apply crisis 
management tools on a collective basis. 
2. The collective approach to humanitarian intervention is the most promising 
ground for justification of action by the EU. The legitimacy of intervention 
should be based on majority consensus within regional organizations, and on 
the support of the international community, non-governmental organizations 
and public opinion. If regional organizations are willing to intervene and 
commit forces to peace operations, UN principles must remain the basis of 
their actions. Collectivity has both advantages and disadvantages, which 
should be understood and utilized by politicians and military leaders. The EU 
must carefully adapt the examples and experiences of the past and adjust the 
doctrine of its military to the requirements and characteristics of multilateral 
peace operations. The EU also should further harmonize its institutions, 
analytical and collective decision-making structures and procedures to 
respond effectively to new challenges. 
3. Besides the questionable legitimacy of armed humanitarian interventions, the 
difficulty the EU has had in formulating common policy was apparently a 
barrier to effective crisis management in the early 1990s. The geographical, 
political, cultural and historic diversities and different national interests of EU 
member states tended to divide their opinions and priorities of concern. 
Despite important changes in CFSP institutions and procedures, core 
differences in views and opinions among member states seem to be 
unchanged, as the disagreement on whether to support US policies toward Iraq 
showed. Based on the case studies presented here, this paper concludes that 
EU members will not be able to reach any agreement on the role of the CFSP 
in crisis management; furthermore, enlargement of the EU will not improve 
the effectiveness of the decision-making process. 
4. The EU is not the only organization bearing responsibility for crisis 
management in Europe. It therefore should work to clarify burdens and task 
sharing with other international and non-governmental organizations. The 
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case study on Bosnia in the third chapter shows that the organizations 
involved in crises management in Bosnia not only lacked consistent principles 
and effective coordination, but in some cases applied controversial approaches 
that contributed to the overall confusion and lack of success. To ensure 
international peace and security, all major actors including the EU must 
coordinate and apply the right combination of diplomacy and force to resolve 
any conflicts that arise. 
5. The problem of translating policies into sound military objectives is another 
core issue of civil-military relations that limits the conduct of peace 
operations. The case studies in the fourth chapter, examining the gaps between 
NATO policies and military objectives, revealed inherent differences between 
politics and the military, and the bounds of using force to accomplish limited 
objectives. National interests, uncertain political will, questions of sharing 
resources and military capabilities, combined with the difficulties of collective 
command and control, probably will prevent the best utilization of military 
assets and the translation of policies into military operations. Without clear 
policy directives, the new Rapid Reaction Force may not be able to define the 
most suitable strategies and objectives for its employment. Politicians and the 
military should be well aware of its requirements, capabilities and limitations. 
Leaders’ competence and cooperation can be key to the success of operations. 
The changing peacekeeping environment requires a deep understanding of 
each situation, advanced planning, flexibility and quick reactions, from 
policy-makers and military leaders alike. All of these criteria require 
improved command, control and communications not only in military 
establishments, but also at the highest political decision-making levels. 
The recognition among EU members that there were weaknesses in formulating 
common policies, and insufficient military capabilities to control the Balkan crisis, 
reinforced their determination to improve the CFSP. There have been a number of 
practical developments within EU institutions, introduced in the fifth chapter, to 
strengthen the effectiveness of procedures, control and planning. The dialogue that was 
initiated with NATO is intended to serve similar objectives, through facilitating cohesion 
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and solidarity on security issues. How those developments will affect the EU’s crisis 
management capability is yet to be assessed. Although the catastrophic events of 
September 11, 2001 initially brought EU members to consensus on common policies 
against terrorism, this course seems to be strongly held only within the core constituency 
of the Union. When it comes to methods of fighting terrorism, there is a large and 
widening difference in the opinions of EU members -- and candidates as well. The 
formation of groups and camps holding diverse positions within the EU does not bode 
well for the desired unity of Europe. What is more, the question of whether the newly 
established RRF should be used not only for Petersberg-delineated tasks, but also for 
other military operations such as fighting international terrorism, was not even touched 
on here. Again, developments such as US preparations for military intervention in Iraq 
(as of February 2003) divide members, and may lead to a less rather than more powerful 
Europe. Prospects for formulating common policies depend on many factors, such as the 
legitimacy of operations; well-arranged institutions; clear decision-making procedures; 
and most fundamentally, readiness to subordinate member interests to the community -- 
if any remains. 
The EU has a long way to go to perfect the CFSP, and to formulate correct and 
timely policies for crisis management. The changes to international law and security 
arrangements discussed above probably would facilitate the EU’s decision-making 
abilities. The EU, however, still must overcome the countless barriers erected by 
members’ history and culture, to take a strong, unified stand on European crisis 
management. And finally, if the EU were to make its CFSP effective, and produced 
useful policies, it still would have to face the limits of policy integration into military 
operations -- turning military victory into political success or facing the consequences of 
military failure.  
All these problems would seem to promise a not very bright future for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and the use of the Rapid Reaction Force. Despite 
this pessimistic outlook, the EU has few options but to work out solutions if it does not 
want to depend on the political will and military capabilities of third parties in future 
European crisis management. 
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Table 1.   Key Structures for CFSP  
Source: “EU Crisis Response Capabilities: An Update” International Crises 























Table 2.   Council Structures for CFSP 
Source: “EU Crisis Response Capabilities: An Update” International Crises 


























(1) The committees report to the Council and the Defence Planning Committee. 
(2) The Military Committee is subordinate to the North Atlantic Council and 
Defense Planning Committee but has a special status as the senior military 
authority in NATO. 
After: NATO Handbook, (Brussels-Belgium: NATO Office of Information and 
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